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Abstract 
As protection of fundamental rights increasingly becomes a 
defining feature of modern constitutionalism, some countries 
debate over the opportunity to introduce systems of direct 
individual access to constitutional judges to increase protection of 
constitutional rights. Part I of the article provides a comparative 
overview of the systems of individual constitutional complaint 
adopted in Europe, focusing on their functioning, structure and 
admissibility requirements. Part II addresses possible benefits of 
the introduction of such a system in Italy. After describing the 
main features of the Italian system of judicial review, the article 
details proposals that, since 1947, have been presented to 
introduce a system of direct individual access to the Italian 
Constitutional Court. Finally, Part III offers reflections on the 
potential advantages that adoption of such complaint would bring 
to the Italian legal system, compared to the currently existing 
avenues of access to the Court. 
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Introduction - Defining the object of the analysis 
In the past thirty years, the original centralized model of 
judicial review, adopted in almost all European countries, has 
progressively developed into a more “subjective” form of 
constitutional control1, as a result of the expansive force of 
                                                 
1 In classifying different systems of judicial review, Spanish constitutional 
scholar Francisco Rubio Llorente developed a juxtaposition between “objective” 
and “subjective” systems, based on the systems’ main center of interest. 
“Objective” systems of judicial review focus on the defense of the authority of 
the law, which can be preserved only if the statutory laws enacted in the system 
are consistent with the constitution; this consistency is seen as a value in itself, 
beneficial to the “purity” of the constitutional system as a whole. Conversely, 
“subjective” models of judicial review focus on the protection of fundamental 
rights. These two aspects are, of course, interrelated: to a certain degree, the 
exercise of a more “objective” type of control also furthers – indirectly – 
protection of fundamental rights, every time that it expels from the system a 
law that unconstitutionally limits the exercise of fundamental rights. At the 
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fundamental rights in modern societies and the adoption of 
comprehensive charters of rights in central and eastern European 
countries. Constitutional courts have come to play a central role in 
the protection of first-, second- and third-generation rights in both 
consolidated and newly established democracies. 
With the assistance of the Council of Europe2, several 
central and eastern European countries that achieved 
independence after the fall of communist rule have revised their 
old constitutions or adopted new fundamental charters to include 
systems of direct individual access to constitutional and supreme 
courts (also called systems of “individual constitutional 
complaint,” hereinafter “ICC”)3. These systems grant natural and 
legal persons direct access to a constitutional or supreme court to 
claim infringement of fundamental constitutional rights and to 
request a declaration of the unconstitutionality of the challenged 
                                                                                                                       
same time, a declaration of the unconstitutionality of a statute limiting 
fundamental rights contributes to the general “objective” “purity” of the 
system, diminishing the number of unconstitutional laws existing in the system. 
The difference between the two models lies, therefore, in the main goals they 
seek to achieve. See F.R. Llorente, Seis tesis sobre la jurisdiccion constitucional en 
Europa, 12 Revista Espanola de Derecho Constitucional 9 (1992); F.R. Llorente, 
Tendances actuelles de la juridiction constitutionnelle en Europe, in Annuaire 
International de Justice Constitutionnelle 9 (1996). For an analysis of the 
differences between “centralized” and “decentralized” systems of judicial 
review, vesting functions of judicial review, respectively, in one single 
specialized court or, conversely, in all ordinary judges, see M. Cappelletti, 
Judicial Review in the Contemporary World 45 (1971); L. Favoreau, Constitutional 
Review in Europe, in L. Henkin & A.J. Rosenthal (eds.), Constitutionalism and 
Rights: The Influence of the United States Constitution Abroad 38 (1990); V.C. 
Jackson & M. Tushnet, Comparative Constitutional Law 464 2d ed. (1999); N. 
Dorsen, M. Rosenfel, A. Sajo & S. Baer, Comparative Constitutionalism: Cases and 
Materials 113 (2003). 
 2 The Council of Europe (“CoE”) is a regional human-rights organization 
established by the Treaty of London on May 5, 1949. The CoE seeks to develop 
throughout Europe common democratic principles based on the European 
Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”), an international human-rights treaty 
signed in Rome on November 4, 1950, see Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221. The CoE has 
now forty-seven Member States with a total population of about 800 million 
people. Respect of the ECHR is guaranteed by a supranational judicial body, the 
European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”), whose interpretation of the 
ECHR and decisions are binding on Member States. 
 3 For present purposes, the expressions “individual constitutional complaint” 
(“ICC”) and “direct individual recourse” to a supreme or constitutional court 
will be considered synonymous. 
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act(s) or action(s) violating their rights (whether with erga omnes or 
inter partes effects)4. 
The Italian Constitution, a product of the wave of 
constitution-drafting that took place after the Second World War5, 
does not envisage the possibility that an action seeking 
constitutional review may be lodged by a citizen or a group of 
citizens directly with the Constitutional Court. In the mixed 
centralized-decentralized system of judicial review adopted in 
Italy, an issue of the constitutionality of legislation – besides those 
cases when a direct action can be filed by constitutionally-
designated State bodies – can be raised only in the course of 
ordinary judicial proceedings in which the challenged law should 
be applied, either upon petition of one of the private parties or of 
the public prosecutor, or on its own initiative by the court. 
However, as protection of fundamental rights becomes a defining 
and predominant feature of modern constitutionalism, the debate 
over the introduction of the possibility for an individual to 
directly apply to the Constitutional Court, claiming infringement 
of a constitutionally-entrenched right by unconstitutional actions 
of a public power, has been increasingly recurrent in Italy. Yet it is 
a debate that dates back to the very foundation of the Italian 
Republic and the adoption of the 1948 Constitution. 
Systems of direct access to constitutional and supreme 
courts are generally considered positively, as they can supplement 
the existing avenues for access to constitutional or supreme courts 
and provide protection of fundamental rights in so-called “grey 
areas” not covered by these types of remedies. Moreover, from a 
supranational perspective, the European Commission for 
Democracy through Law of the Council of Europe6 considers 
                                                 
 4 Conversely, in systems of indirect individual access, the constitutionality of 
an act or action can be challenged only through the action of previously 
identified state bodies (e.g. courts).  
 5 See J. Elster, Forces and Mechanisms in the Constitution-Making Process, 45 Duke 
L.J. 364, 368-373 (1995) (identifying seven waves of constitution-making). With 
specific regard to judicial review, Louis Favoreau speaks of four waves of 
constitutional justice: see L. Favoreau, Les Cours Constitutionnelles 1-2, 4, 3d ed. 
(1996). 
 6 The European Commission for Democracy through Law (also known as 
“Venice Commission”) is the Council of Europe’s advisory body on 
constitutional matters. Established in 1990, over the years it has played a 
leading role in advising on the adoption of constitutions that conform to the 
standards of Europe’s constitutional heritage. In 2002, it was authorized by the 
CoE to accept non-European observer members and currently has fifty-seven 
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positively the adoption of such systems – provided  they do not 
overburden the domestic court vested with power of judicial 
review – as they represent an effective filter for cases of alleged 
violations of fundamental rights before they reach the European 
Court of Human Rights7. 
However, if not properly designed, these systems are likely 
to result in the overburdening of a constitutional or supreme court 
due to the high number of applications lodged8. The balance 
between an effective protection of human rights and an efficient 
and timely exercise of the high court’s functions has been struck 
differently in different jurisdictions: several States have declined 
to adopt a system of individual constitutional complaint 
altogether, while others have established strict accessibility 
requirements making direct recourse a merely subsidiary 
mechanism for the protection of constitutional rights and 
requiring, for example, the previous exhaustion of all other legal 
remedies or the special “constitutional significance” of the 
question of constitutionality to be presented. 
Part I of this article will provide a comparative overview of 
the structure and functioning of the systems of direct access to 
constitutional and supreme courts adopted in Europe, focusing on 
the structure of the individual constitutional complaint and on 
admissibility requirements. With regard to this latter aspect, the 
present analysis will comprise all systems of individual 
constitutional complaint irrespective of requirements (if any) 
established for standing to file the claim. The analysis will 
                                                                                                                       
Member States and eleven more Associate, Observer and Special-Status States. 
See Venice Commission, Council of Europe, 
http://www.venice.coe.int/site/main/Presentation_E.asp (last visited January 
2012).  
7 The Commission underlines that: “the European Court of Human Rights’ 
statistics show that those countries in which such a full constitutional complaint 
mechanism exists have a lower number of complaints (in proportion to the 
number of their population) before the Court than others, which do not have 
such a mechanism. Such complaint mechanisms therefore help to avoid 
overburdening the European Court of Human Rights”. Venice Commission 
Study no. 538/2009, adopted by the Commission during its 85th Plenary session 
held in Venice, Italy on 17-18 December 2010 at 4, available at 
http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2010/CDL-AD(2010)039rev-e.pdf (last 
visited January 2012). For the final version of the “Study on Individual Access 
to Constitutional Justice,” see 86th Plenary Session of the Commission (Venice), 
Calendar of Events, Venice Commission, Council of Europe, 
http://www.venice.coe.int (last visited January 2012). 
 8 As it happened, for example, in Croatia and Spain. 
GENTILI – A COMPARISON OF EUROPEAN SYSTEMS 
164 
 
therefore include both systems which adopted the so-called “actio 
popularis” (where every person is entitled to challenge an act of the 
public powers after its enactment, without the need to prove that 
he or she is affected by the provision: e.g., Croatia and 
Liechtenstein) and systems where evidence of (probable) harm is 
required. Also, the analysis will be conducted on several systems 
of individual constitutional complaint, irrespective of the choice 
made in the single legal system with regard to the possible object 
of the challenge: actions and/or omissions of public powers, 
statutory laws and/or regulations. 
Part II will then address possible benefits (if any) of the 
introduction of such a system in Italy. After presenting the main 
features of the Italian system of judicial review, the article will 
describe proposals that, since 1947, have been presented to 
introduce a system of direct individual access to the Italian 
Constitutional Court in order to supplement the already existing 
avenues of access to the Court. 
Part III will then offer some reflections on the actual 
advantages (if any) that adoption of such a system would bring to 
the Italian legal system, compared to the already existing 
incidenter control of constitutionality (“controllo di costituzionalita 
in via incidentale”). 
 
 
I. A Comparative Overview of the European Systems of 
Individual Constitutional Complaint 
In Europe, several countries have adopted a system of 
individual constitutional complaint, in a variety of structures and 
forms. A more detailed analysis of a few of these jurisdictions and 
of the specific systems of individual constitutional complaint 
adopted therein will provide a general comparative framework for 
our study and help determine whether Italy too should 
incorporate such a system to enhance protection of fundamental 
rights. Austria and Germany have been chosen since their 
constitutions belong – as the Italian one – to the wave of 
constitution-drafting which took place after the Second World 
War; Spain has been chosen to illustrate the possible shortcomings 
of the adoption of a highly open system of individual 
constitutional complaint; Switzerland as a country characterized 
by a tradition of direct popular participation and direct access to 
institutional bodies; finally, Belgium has been chosen to show how 
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even a relatively old constitution can be modified to include a 
system of individual constitutional complaint.  
 
 
A) Austria  
Austria has both historical and contemporary significance 
for any comparative study of systems of judicial review: on one 
hand, it represents one of the two European countries to first 
adopt a system of judicial review in its archetypal centralized 
(Kelsenian) form9; on the other, and more relevantly to this study, 
Austria represents the jurisdiction that first adopted – among the 
German-speaking areas of Europe – a system of individual 
constitutional complaint10. 
The current Constitution of the Republic of Austria 
(“Bundesverfassungsgesetz”) was adopted in 192011. After 
undergoing revision in 1929, it was suspended in 1933 until the 
end of the Second World War and then reinstated in 1945. 
                                                 
 9 The first European centralized systems of judicial review were established in 
Czechoslovakia and Austria by, respectively, the Constitution of 
Czechoslovakia of February 29, 1920, and by the Constitution of Austria of 
October 1, 1920. The systems were based on the ideas of the Prague-born jurist 
Hans Kelsen and are universally recognized as the prototypes of the centralized 
systems of judicial review, and as a counter model to the United States system 
of judicial review. Some authors note, however, that a form of centralized 
constitutional review already existed in 1858 in Venezuela, although it did not 
develop into a prototype: see J.O. Frosini, Constitutional Courts in Latin America: 
A Testing Ground for New Parameters of Classification, in A. Harding & P. Leyland 
(eds.), Constitutional Courts. A Comparative Study, JCL Studies in Comparative 
Law 1, 348 (2009).  
 10 Staatsgrundgesetz uber die allgemeinen Rechte der Staatsburger [StGG] [federal 
bill of rights] RGBI No. 1867/143 (Austria). The individual constitutional 
complaint was first introduced in Austria by the Fundamental Law of the State 
(Staatsgrundgesetz) which created a new “Court of the Reich” (Oberstes 
Reichsgericht), a forerunner of the current Constitutional Court. One of the 
functions of the Court was to judge complaints filed by citizens alleging a 
violation of the political rights – especially fundamental rights and the right to 
vote – protected in the Fundamental Law of the State on the Rights of the 
Citizens against administrative acts (legislative acts were excluded from 
scrutiny); see Staatsgrundgesetz uber die allgemeinen Rechte der Staatsburger [StGG] 
[federal bill of rights] RGBI No. 1867/142, as last amended by Bundesgesetz [BG] 
BGB I No. 100/2003, art. 142 (Austria). 
 11 Bundes-Verfassungsgesetz der Republik Osterreich [B-VG] [Constitution] BGBl 
No. 1/1920 (Austria). Between 1934 and 1945, Austria was ruled under the 1934 
authoritarian Constitution. The activity of the Austrian Constitutional Court 
was interrupted in May 1933 to resume only in 1946.  
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In addition to the extant incidenter procedure for the 
assessment of the constitutionality of legal acts set forth in articles 
89 and 129 of the Constitution, the current text of the Austrian 
Constitution provides two possible avenues for individuals to 
directly access the Constitutional Court (“Verfassungsgerichtshof”) 
in order to challenge legal acts allegedly violating their 
fundamental rights. 
The first avenue (so-called Bescheidbeschwerde) is described 
at article 144 of the Constitution, which allows direct individual 
complaints against an administrative decision violating a person’s 
rights through the application of an illegal general norm. As a 
precondition to the admissibility of the challenge, the applicant is 
requested to have previously exhausted all remedies made 
available by administrative law, so that, in practice, only the 
ruling of the last (supreme) administrative  instance may be a 
subject of the Court’s review12. Moreover, a challenge to the last 
administrative ruling can be filed only within six weeks of its 
delivery. 
The second avenue was created by a 1975 amendment that 
introduced an additional type of individual constitutional 
complaint (called Individualantrag or Individualbeschwerde)13. With 
regard to this second avenue, articles 139 and 140 of the 
Constitution indicate that the Constitutional Court pronounces on 
the unconstitutionality of statutes and on the illegality of 
regulations when the application alleges direct infringement of 
personal rights through such unconstitutionality or illegality in so 
far as the law or the regulation has become operative for the 
applicant without the delivery of a judicial decision or the issue of 
a ruling14. Admissibility requirements are therefore quite 
demanding: in order for the complaint to be admissible, the 
applicant (either a natural or a legal person) must show that no 
chance of obtaining another legal remedy is available and that 
                                                 
 12 See A. Gamper, The Constitutional Court of Austria: Modern Profiles of an 
Archetype of Constitutional Review, in A. Harding & P. Leyland (eds.), 
Constitutional Courts. A Comparative Study, JCL Studies in Comparative Law 1, 
44 (2009). 
 13 Bundesverfassungsgesetz [BVG] [Amendment of the Federal Constitution, as 
amended in 1929, provisions for the extension of the States of the Board 
Administrative Court and the Constitutional Court] Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBl] 
No. 302/1975 (Austria). 
 14 Bundes-Verfassungsgesetz der Republik Osterreich, supra note 47, at art. 139 
and art. 140 (Austria). 
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neither a judgment nor an administrative ruling has been 
delivered in the case. Moreover, the alleged harm to the 
applicant’s rights must be personal, direct and actual. 
Both types of individual constitutional complaints clearly 
have a subsidiary character and are designed only to supplement 
the other avenues available to an individual to challenge the 
constitutionality of normative enactments (mainly the incidenter 
proceedings). 
 
 
B) Germany 
Together with the incidenter review of legislation regulated 
at article 100, the 1949 German Constitution (“Grundgesetz”) today 
also establishes at article 93(4a) a system of individual 
constitutional complaint (direct individual recourse or 
Verfassungsbeschwerde). In Germany, the possibility for an 
individual to directly access the Constitutional Court 
(“Bundesverfassungsgericht”) for the protection of fundamental 
rights, is consistent with the general spirit of the German 
Constitution, which – adopted in the aftermath of the Second 
World War – strongly reaffirmed the central role of human dignity 
and fundamental rights in order to prevent the reoccurrence of the 
tragic violations of human rights the country had experienced 
during the war15. 
The original text of the Constitution did not establish a 
system of individual constitutional complaint. This system was 
first introduced in 1951 with the enactment of the Law on the 
Federal Constitutional Court, which also marked the beginning of 
the activities of that Court16. The system was then entrenched in 
the Constitution with a constitutional amendment in 196917. The 
                                                 
 15 Grundgesetz fur die Bundesrepublik Deutschland [Federal Constitution] [GG] 
art. 1 (F.R.G.). This commitment to protection of human dignity and 
fundamental rights is celebrated in article 1 of the German Constitution, which 
famously asserts: “Human dignity shall be inviolable. To respect and protect it 
shall be the duty of all state authority... . The German people therefore 
acknowledge inviolable and inalienable human rights as the basis of every 
community, of peace and of justice in the world. The following basic rights shall 
bind the legislature, the executive and the judiciary as directly applicable law.” 
 16 Bundesverfassungsgerichts-Gesetz [Federal Constitional Court Act], March 12, 
1951, BGBl. I at 243 (F.R.G.). 
 17 Article 93(4a) of the German Constitution now states that the Federal 
Constitutional Court has jurisdiction over constitutional complaints filed by any 
person alleging that one of his or her basic rights has been infringed by an act or 
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recourse can be lodged – without cost and with few formal 
requirements – by every person (both citizens and foreign 
nationals, legal and natural persons) against an action or omission 
of the public powers allegedly violating civil and political rights 
entrenched in the Constitution18. 
Since its establishment, the direct individual recourse has 
become the most frequently resorted-to avenue to access the 
Court, which, over the years, has developed in its jurisprudence 
some admissibility criteria in order to limit use of the individual-
constitutional-complaint system and avoid the overburdening of 
the Court19. These conditions are: a) the previous exhaustion of all 
available legal remedies20; b) the existence of a personal, direct, 
and current interest in the recourse21; c) filing within a statute of 
limitation: the recourse can be lodged with the Court only within 
one month from the date the administrative act or the judicial 
decision has been issued, or one year from the entry into force of 
the challenged statute22; d) the possibility to challenge only self-
                                                                                                                       
action or omission of the public authority (including judicial decisions). See 
Grundgesetz fur die Bundesrepublik Deutschland [Federal Constitution] [GG] art. 
93(4) (F.R.G.). A complaint can be lodged against the unconstitutional violation 
of articles 1-19, 20(2), 33, 38, 101, 102, 103 and 104 of the Constitution. See, 
Bundesverfassungsgerichts-Gesetz [Federal Constitional Court Act] arts. 13, 90 & 
95, as last amended July 16, 1998, BGBl. I at 1473 (F.R.G). Over the years, the 
Constitutional Court has adopted a generous interpretation of the right to a 
“free development of [one’s own] personality” of article 2, cl. 1 Cont. and has 
therefore broadened the protection offered and the possibility to lodge a 
recourse. 
 18 See Bundesverfassungsgerichts-Gesetz [Federal Constitional Court Act] art. 93, 
as last amended July 16, 1998, BGBl. I at 1473 (F.R.G). See also D.P. Kommers, 
Das Bundesverfassungsgericht: Procedure, Practice and Policy of the German Federal 
Constitutional Court, in A. Harding & P. Leyland (eds.), Constitutional Courts. A 
Comparative Study, JCL Studies in Comparative Law 1, 113 (2009).  
 19 In 2006, for the first time, the applications filed with the Constitutional 
Court within the year were more than 6,000. In the average, the Court receives 
around 5,000 applications each year: 98% of them are individual constitutional 
complaints. Notwithstanding these high figures, 70% of the direct individual 
recourses are taken care of within a year. The percentage of successful recourses 
is low, around 2.5%. See F. Palermo, La Giustizia Costituzionale in Germania, in L. 
Mezzetti (ed.), Sistemi e modelli di giustizia costituzionale 152 (2009). Figures are 
available, in English, on the website of the German Constitutional Court: 
http://www.bverfg.de (last visited, January 2012). 
 20 Art. 93 of the Law on the Federal Constitutional Court. 
 21 Id.  
 22 Id. 
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executing statutes23. The screening of the petitions is entrusted to 
special three-judge panels of the Court, the so-called “Kammer” 
(chambers) during a prehearing stage, and the decision is not 
appealable24. The Court also has the power to issue fines to those 
who lodge applications lacking the very basic elements for their 
admissibility25. In addition to these conditions, the Law on the 
Federal Constitutional Court states that a constitutional complaint 
will be admitted to consideration only if it has “fundamental 
constitutional significance” (i.e. the issue has not already been 
addressed by the Court), and the complainant may suffer 
“especially grave disadvantage as a result of refusal to decide on 
the complaint.”26 
As of today, the Court reviews in full about one percent of 
all the individual constitutional complaints lodged, but according 
to some commentators, “such complaints result in some of its 
most significant decisions and make up more than fifty percent of 
its published opinions.”27 
C) Spain 
Spain represents a very interesting country study in the 
analysis of the general effects that adoption of the ICC can have on 
a country’s system of judicial review. Influenced by the example 
of the German Verfassungsbeschwerde28, the Spanish “individual 
appeal for protection” (“recurso de amparo”) or “constitutional 
amparo” was introduced by article 53, cl. 2 of the 1978 
Constitution29. The constitutional amparo was then implemented 
in the Organic Law on the Constitutional Court enacted in 1979. 
                                                 
 23 See K. Schlaich, Procedures and techniques de protection des droit fondamentaux. 
Tribunal Constitutionnel Federal allemand, in L. Favoreu (ed.), Cours 
constitutionnelles europeennes et droits fondamentaux 105-164 (1982). 
 24 See W. Heun, The Constitution of Germany. A Contextual Analysis 175 (2011).  
 25 Fines can be as high as 2,600 Euros.  
 26 Art. 93a, cl.2 of the Law on the Federal Constitutional Court. 
 27 D.P. Kommers & R.A. Miller, Das Bundesverfassungsgericht: Procedure, 
Practice and Policy of the German Federal Constitutional Court, 3 J. COMP. L. 194-211 
(2008).  
 28 On the influence exerted by the German system of judicial review on the 
Spanish Constitution, see F.R. Llorente, La jurisdiccion constitucional en Espana, in 
R.F. Llorente & J.J. Campo (eds.), Estudios sobre la jurisdiccion constitucional 
(1997).  
 29 However, a “recurso de amparo” had been originally established in Spain by 
the 1931 Constitution of the Spanish Second Republic, at that time influenced by 
both the Austrian model of individual constitutional complaint adopted in 1920 
and the Mexican model. The 1931 Constitution created a Tribunal of 
Constitutional Guaranties vested with the power to judge upon the 
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Today, in Spain, any natural and legal person (not just 
citizens) with a “legitimate interest”30 can apply to the Tribunal 
Constitucional by means of the constitutional amparo to challenge 
violations of the rights protected in articles 14-30 of the 1978 
Constitution allegedly caused by actions or omissions of public 
powers31. More specifically, the constitutional amparo can be 
exercised to challenge administrative acts, judicial decisions and 
legislative enactments – with the exclusion of statutory laws – 
after prior exhaustion of all available legal remedies32. 
Since the enactment of the Constitution and the 
introduction of the ICC, an increasing number of appeals for 
protection have reached the Constitutional Court, most of them 
claiming violations of the rights granted under article 24 of the 
                                                                                                                       
constitutionality of statutes and to protect fundamental rights by means of a 
recourse for constitutional protection: see, A.R. Brewer-Carias, Constitutional 
protection of Human Rights in Latin America 74 (2009); E.F. Mac-Gregor, La accion 
constitucional de amparo en Mexico y Espana, Estudio de Derecho Comparado 4th ed. 
(2007).  
30 Article 162 of the Constitution. 
31 See articles 53(2) and 161 of the 1978 Constitution of Spain and articles 41-47 
and 50 of Organic Law on the Constitutional Court no. 2/1979 of Oct. 3, 1979 
(last amended in 2007). Provisions of the original 1979 Organic Law concerning 
the constitutional amparo have been amended a few times: Organic Law no. 
8/1984 amended article 45 concerning use of the amparo for protection of the 
right to conscientious objection; Organic Law of June 9, 1988, amended articles 
50 and 86 concerning admissibility criteria for the amparo; Organic Law no. 
6/2007 introduced the requirement of the “significant constitutional relevance” 
of the issue for the recourse to be declared admissible. The rights protected are 
so-called “first” and “second” generation rights (that is, civil and political), 
while “third” generation rights (social) cannot be protected through the 
constitutional amparo, since they are listed at arts. 39 through 52; the same 
exclusion applies to the right to property, entrenched in art. 33. See D.M. 
Carrasco, Los procesos para la tutela judicial de los derechos fundamentales (2002). 
For an overview of the structure and functions of the Tribunal Constitucional in 
Spain, see E.G. Lopez, Judicial Review In Spain: The Constitutional Court, 41 Loy. 
L.A. L. REV. 529 (2008).  
 32 Article 41 of the Organic law on the Constitutional Court states: “provisions, 
legal enactments, omissions or flagrantly illegal actions by the public authorities 
of the State, the Autonomous Communities and other territorial, corporate or 
institutional public bodies, as well as their officials or agents.” Article 47 of the 
Organic Law states that, in cases in which a judicial decision is challenged, 
“those who benefited by the decision, act or fact that led to the appeal or 
persons with a legitimate interest therein may appear in the proceedings for 
constitutional protection as a defendant or additional party.” 
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Spanish Constitution: effective protection from judges33. As a 
consequence of the high number of individual complaints filed 
with the Tribunal Constitucional, the functionality of the body was 
significantly affected: most of the activity of the Tribunal was 
devoted to deciding the appeals for constitutional amparo and, 
over the years, the average time needed for the Court to perform 
all its functions significantly increased, almost creating a real 
“crisis” for the functionality of the Court34. 
The structure of the constitutional amparo underwent 
therefore significant reform in 2007, focusing on the requirements 
for accessing the Tribunal Constitucional35. The purpose of the 
reform was to limit the possibility for individuals to directly 
access the Constitutional Court, on the assumption that 
fundamental rights could and should be protected – first and 
foremost – by ordinary judges and only afterward by the 
Constitutional Court and exclusively in cases in which the plaintiff  
could demonstrate the novelty of the constitutional issues36. The 
2007 reform, therefore, introduced an additional accessibility 
requirement: the applicant needed now demonstrate the 
“significant constitutional relevance” of the recourse presented37. 
                                                 
 33 On this point see M. Iacometti, La Spagna, in P. Carrozza, A. Di Giovine & 
G.F. Ferrari (eds.), Diritto costituzionale comparato ( 2009).  
 34 Between 1980 and 1998, about 48,000 appeals for constitutional protection 
were filed, with the number gradually increasing over the years. More 
specifically, in 1980 the appeals were 218; in 1981, they were 393; 1982 (438); 
1983 (834); 1984 (807); 1985 (970); 1986 (1.229); 1987 (1.659); 1988 (2.129); 1989 
(2.604); 1990 (2.910); 1991 (2.707); 1992 (3.229); 1993 (3.877); 1994 (4.173); 1995 
(4.369); 1996 (4.689); 1997 (5.391); 1998 (5.441). Of the 9.708 applications filed 
with the Tribunal Constitucional in 2005, 9.476 of them were individual appeals 
lodged through the constitutional amparo. Figures are available on the website 
of the Spanish Tribunal Constitucional: http://www.tribunalconstitucional.es 
(last visited January 2012). Prof. Tania Groppi referred to this phenomenon as a 
“crisis of the amparo recourse.” T. Groppi, Il ricorso di amparo in Spagna: caratteri, 
problemi e prospettive, 4340 in Giurisprudenza Costituzionale (1997); E.C. 
Cuenca, La crisis del recurso de amparo: la proteccion de los derechos fundamentales 
entre el Poder judicial y el Tribunal constitucional (2005).  
 35 Organic Law no. 6/2007. 
 36 V.F. Comella, The Spanish Constitutional Court: Time for Reforms, in A. 
Harding & P. Leyland (eds.), Constitutional Courts 193 (2009).  
 37 In the original Spanish “trascendencia constitucional.” See article 50(1)(b) of 
the Organic law as amended in 2007. According to article 50(1) of the Organic 
Law, in order for the recourse to have “significant relevance,” the issue must be 
significant for the “importance for the interpretation, application and general 
efficacy of the Constitution and for a determination of the content and 
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Today, the vast majority of applications lodged with the Court are 
declared inadmissible due to the very lack of the constitutional 
nature of the alleged violation38. 
A different statute of limitations applies to the various acts 
that can be challenged: while legislative enactments can be 
challenged only within three months from their enactment 
approval, a constitutional amparo against judicial decisions must 
be filed within thirty days from notification of the decision39. 
 
 
D) Switzerland 
The so-called “recourse in cases of public law” finds its 
basic regulation in article 189 of the 1999 Federal Constitution of 
the Swiss Confederation and in article 82 of the Law on the 
Federal Tribunal40. According to these provisions, the Federal 
Supreme Court (the highest Court of the system, vested with 
powers of judicial review in Switzerland) has jurisdiction over 
complaints about violations of constitutional rights prompted by 
judicial decisions issued in public-law cases and by normative acts 
enacted by the administrative and legislative bodies of the 
Cantons (i.e. the sub-national units of the federation). It also has 
competence over applications filed by citizens for violations of the 
right to vote and of regulations on general election and popular 
voting procedures41. 
                                                                                                                       
significance of fundamental rights.” The Constitutional Court has further 
specified this requirement in decision STC no. 155/2009. 
 38 V.F. Comella, The Spanish Constitutional Court: Time for Reforms, cit. at 36, 
193. 
 39 Id. 
 40 The current Constitution of the Confederation of Switzerland was adopted 
by popular vote on April 18, 1999. The Constitution replaces the prior 1874 
Federal Constitution after a total revision intended to update the previous 
document without changing its substance. The 1999 Constitution describes the 
Swiss Confederation as a full-fledged federal republic composed of 26 Cantons 
(sub-national units). It also includes a catalogue of individual and popular 
rights (including rights to call for popular referenda on federal laws and 
constitutional amendments, in analogy to constitutional-initiatives mechanisms 
included in several United States state constitutions) and indicates the 
competences of the Cantons and the Federal Government. See A. Auer, G. 
Malinverni, & .l Hottelier, Droit constitutionnel suisse 2 (2006). Together with 
article 189 of the Constitution, articles 82, 86, 89, 113, 115 and 116 of the Law on 
the Federal Tribunal of June 17, 2005 detail the procedure for lodging an 
individual constitutional complaint. 
 41 See Federal Judicature Act, arts. 82 & 86 (1943).  
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According to article 89 of the Federal Judicature Act, the 
recourse can be lodged with the Federal Supreme Court by those 
subjects who were parties in a case (in case of judicial decisions) 
and by everyone who is “significantly affected by the challenged 
decision or act” and who can demonstrate a significant interest in 
the annulment of the acts42. 
The main purpose of the constitutional complaint is 
therefore to protect citizens from the action of public powers; only 
indirectly does it guarantee that unconstitutional laws are not kept 
in effect within the legal systems43. The challenged acts can be of a 
legislative, judicial44 or administrative nature. However, an 
important limit to the system of individual constitutional 
complaint, here, is determined by the fact that only Cantonal acts 
– and not those of the Federation – can be challenged for 
constitutionality45 and only provided the absence at the Cantonal 
level of any other legal remedy against the act. 
The recourse must be lodged within thirty days from the 
judicial decision or the entry into force of the act. 
 
 
E) Belgium 
The original 1831 Constitution of the Kingdom of Belgium 
has undergone significant revision in recent years. The possibility 
for a legal or natural person to lodge an individual constitutional 
complaint with the Belgian Constitutional Court was introduced 
in 1988 to supplement the already existing incidenter review46. In 
2007, the original Cour d’Arbitrage – whose activity had 
                                                 
 42 Id. art. 89. 
 43 See E. Ferioli, La Giustizia Costituzionale in Svizzera, in L. Mezzetti (ed.), 
Sistemi e Modelli di Giustizia Costituzionale (2009).  
 44 Federal Judicature Act, arts. 83 & 90-93 (1943) specify further prerequisites 
for judicial decisions to be challenged and also a few typologies of decisions 
which are – at the opposite – excluded from the complaint.  
 45 The Constitutions of the Cantons are, however, excluded. See Constitution 
Federale [Cst] [Constitution] Apr. 18, 1999, RO 101 art. 51, cl. 2 (Switz.). Article 
190 of the 1999 Federal Constitution has been consistently interpreted by the 
Federal Tribunal as precluding the Tribunal from judging on the 
constitutionality of Federal acts. Article 190 of the Federal Constitution states: 
“The Federal Supreme Court and the other judicial authorities shall apply the 
federal acts and international law.” This exclusion, however, has recently been 
subject to significant exceptions. See E. Ferioli, La Svizzera, in P. Carrozza, A. Di 
Giovine & G.F. Ferrari (eds.), Diritto costituzionale comparato 326 (2009).  
 46 See 1831 Const. art. 142 (Belg.); Special Act Law of Jan. 6, 1989, Moniteur 
Belge [M.B.] [Official Gazette of Belgium], Jan. 7, 1989, art. 2 (Belg.). 
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increasingly shifted from mere policing of the areas of competence 
of the federal government and the federated units, towards a role 
akin to a judge protecting the rights and liberties entrenched in the 
Constitution – formally changed into a full-fledged Constitutional 
Court (“Cour Constitutionnelle”) which now protects and enforces 
the constitutional rights listed under Title II (arts. 8-32) and at arts. 
170, 172 and 191 of the Constitution47. 
The individual constitutional complaint can be lodged by a 
legal or natural person to obtain a declaration of 
unconstitutionality within six months of the enactment of the 
challenged normative act (generally, federal statutes – ordinary 
and special – regional decrees, ordinances of the Bruxelles Region 
and acts with the force of law issued by the Executive)48. A 
declaration of unconstitutionality has the effect of annulling the 
challenged acts and – generally – acts retroactively49. Similarly, a 
rejection of the constitutional challenge binds all judges to the 
interpretation of the challenged norm given by the Court50. 
 
 
F) Central and Eastern European States 
The fall of the communist regimes in central and eastern 
Europe and the resulting need to establish new constitutional 
foundations for the emerging democracies prompted a wave of 
constitution-making and democracy-building characterized by the 
establishment, in the newly independent states, of centralized 
systems of judicial review51. The adoption of such systems was the 
                                                 
 47 See E. Ferioli, Il Belgio, in P. Carrozza, A. Di Giovine & G.F. Ferrari (eds.), 
Diritto costituzionale comparato 326 (2009). 
 48 Const. art. 142 (Belg.). 
 49 See N. Vizioli, La giustizia costituzionale in Belgio, in J. Luther, R. Romboli & 
R. Tarchi (eds.), Esperienze di giustizia costituzionale 491 (2000); P. Carrozza, La 
Cour d'Arbitrage belga, in G.F. Ferrari & A. Gambaro (eds.), Corti nazionali e 
comparazione giuridica 105 (2006).  
 50 Special Act Law of Jan. 6, 1989, Moniteur Belge [M.B.] [Official Gazette of 
Belgium], Jan. 7, 1989, art. 9 (Belg.).  
 51 According to Prof. Andrew Harding, constitutional courts have become a 
key element of constitutional design since, in addition to upholding values of 
legality and constitutionalism, “[they] might be conceived as a device to 
counter-balance the otherwise potentially overwhelming capacity of the elected 
majority to achieve domination at the expense of any opposition” and 
“defending provisions intended to protect human rights and minority rights.” 
Moreover, “in many developing nations negotiating a hazardous path to 
democracy, the constitutional court has come to be regarded as a vital guarding 
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product of an intense circulation of models of constitutional 
justice. The German and Austrian models were particularly 
influential not only for reasons of geographical and cultural 
proximity, but also due to the role played by the Council of 
Europe in the processes of revision of constitutional documents 
and constitution-drafting52. The Council of Europe’s special 
constitutional advisory body, the European Commission for 
Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission), indeed stressed 
the importance of the creation of constitutional courts as a 
fundamental element to recognize a country’s achieved 
democratic status and its adherence to the rule of law53. 
In these countries the creation of Constitutional Courts 
occurred, in most cases54, in conjunction with the introduction of 
systems of individual constitutional complaint, designed to 
supplement the already existing systems of incidenter review to 
access the Constitutional Court vested with functions of judicial 
review. Moreover, the ICC system was almost always introduced 
with the requirement of the previous exhaustion of all available 
judicial remedies. 
The individual constitutional complaint has been adopted 
in the following countries: Republic of Albania55, Armenia56, 
                                                                                                                       
of the constitution.” A. Harding, Preface, in A. Harding & P. Leyland (eds.), 
Constitutional Courts: A Comparative Study 1 (2009).  
 52 The German and Austrian models of constitutional justice have been 
considered so influential that some commentators were drawn to state that “the 
establishing of constitutional review was a clear case of constitutional 
borrowing.” K. Lach & W. Sadurski, Constitutional Courts of Central and Eastern 
Europe: Between Adolescence and Maturity, in A. Harding & P. Leyland (eds.), 
Constitutional Courts: A Comparative Study 58 (2009). 
 53 See V. Commission, The Role of the Constitutional Court in the Consolidation of 
the Rule of Law, in 10 Science and Techniques of Democracy (1994). This follows 
Laszlo Solyom’s belief that “the very existence of these courts obviously served 
as a ‘trade mark,’ or as a proof, of the democratic character of the respective 
country.” L. Solyom, The Role of Constitutional Courts in the Transition to 
Democracy: With Special Reference to Hungary, 18 Int'l Soc. 133, 134 (2003). For 
more information on the Council of Europe’s role in these processes and in the 
establishment of constitutional courts, see W. Sadurski, Rights Before Courts: A 
Study of Constitutional Courts in Postcommunist States of Central and Eastern 
Europe 2d ed. (2007). 
 54 With the exception of Bulgaria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Lithuania, 
Moldova, Romania. 
 55 See Const., arts. 131 & 134 (1998) (Alb.).  
 56 For a description of individual appeals, see Constitution, Art. 101(6) (2005) 
(Arm.); see also Law on the Constitutional Court, arts. 25 & 69 (2006) (Arm.). In 
addition to natural persons, legal persons are also eligible to apply directly to 
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Croatia57, Czech Republic58, Estonia59, Georgia60, Hungary61, 
Latvia62, Montenegro63, Poland64, Serbia65, Slovak Republic66, 
Slovenia67, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia68, and 
Ukraine69. Other eastern European countries which did not adopt 
                                                                                                                       
the Constitutional Court. See Constitution, art. 42.1 (2005) (Arm.); see also 
Constitutional Ct. Act, art. 25 (2006).  
 57 See Constitution, art. 128 (1990) (Croat.). See also Constitutional Act on the 
Constitutional Ct., arts. 30, 40, & 62 (Official Gazette No. 49/2002) (Croat.).  
 58 See Constitution, art. 87 (1992) (Czech.); see also Constitutional Ct. Act, arts. 
64, 72, & 74 (1993) (Czech.).  
 59 See Constitution, art. 152 (1992) (Est.); see also Law on the Constitutional 
Review Ct. Procedure Act, arts. 16 & 18 (Est.). 
 60 See Constitution, art. 89 (1995) (Geor.); see also Law on the Constitutional 
Legal Proceedings, art. 1 (1996) (Geor.); see also Organic Law on the 
Constitutional Ct., art. 39 (amended 2004) (Geor.). 
 61 See Constitution, Art. 32/A (1949) (Hung.); see also Act. No. XXXII on the 
Constitutional Ct., Arts. 1, 21, 38, & 48 (1989) (Hung.). See also Constitution, Art. 
24 (enacted on April 25, 2011) (Hung.).  
 62 See Constitution, art. 85 (amended 2007) (Lat.); see also Law on the 
Constitutional Ct., art. 19(2) (Lat.).  
 63 See Constitution, art. 149 (2007) (Montenegro); see also Law on the 
Constitutional Ct. of Montenegro, arts. 48-59 (Official Gazette 64/2008) 
(Montenegro). 
 64 See Constitution, art. 79 (1997) (Pol.); see also Constitutional Trib. Act, arts. 27 
& 46 (1997) (Pol.)  
 65 The Constitution of 2006 introduced a system of constitutional complaint in 
Serbia for the first time. See Constitution, arts. 168-170 (Serb.); see also Law on 
the Constitutional Ct., arts. 82-90 (2007) (Serb.). For an overview of the ICC 
system in Serbia, see N. Plavsic, Individual Constitutional Complaint: Serbian Model 
(2008) (unpublished dissertation for the Comparing Constitutional 
Adjudication Summer School (Co.Co.A.) at the University of Trento, Italy) 
available at http://www.jus.unitn.it/cocoa/papers/papers.html (last visited 
January 2012). 
 66 See Constitution, arts. 127, 127(a), & 130 (1992) (Slovk.); see also Law on the 
Organization of the Constitutional Ct., arts. 18 & 49 (Slovk.).  
 67 See Constitution, arts. 160 & 162 (1991) (Slovn.); see also Constitutional Court 
Act, arts. 24 & 50 (1994) (Slovn.). On the Slovenian ICC system, see T. Melart, L. 
Zore, The Individual Constitutional Complaint in Slovenia (2008) (unpublished 
dissertation for Co.Co.A. at the University of Trento, Italy) available at 
http:/www.jus.unitn.it/cocoa/papers/papers.html (last visited January 2012). 
The paper also describes in detail the strict criteria recently adopted to 
determine admissibility of the recourses to promote judicial economy. 
 68 Article 110 of the 1991 Constitution of the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia and articles 11, 12, 28 and 51 of the Rules of Procedure were 
adopted by the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Macedonia on October 
7, 1992. 
 69 Ukr. Const. of 1996, ch. 2, arts. 55, 150; Law on the Constitutional Court of 
Ukraine (promulgated by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukr., Oct. 16, 1996, effective 
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the ICC system when their constitutions were drafted have 
subsequently considered its adoption70. 
The systems of individual constitutional complaint (ICC) 
adopted in these countries drew inspiration from the model 
outlined by the guidelines of the Venice Commission. Indeed, as 
we have seen, the Venice Commission favors the adoption of such 
a system for a variety of  reasons, including that direct recourse to 
a constitutional court can operate as filter for cases of alleged 
violations of fundamental rights before they are lodged with the 
European Court of Human Rights, helping to avoid 
overburdening of the Strasbourg Court71. 
Due to this influence, the ICC systems adopted in these 
countries share several common features, of which the following 
should be noted: a) the requirement that an aggrieved party 
exhaust all available legal remedies before filing a complaint with 
the Constitutional Court72; b) the right of an individual (in some 
jurisdictions) to file for recourse against acts or actions of private 
entities (natural and legal persons), provided they exercise public 
authority (generally, the acts that can be challenged for violation 
of constitutionally protected rights are those of public powers)73; 
c) the challengeability of not only statutes but also regulations, 
administrative acts, and less frequently, judicial decisions74; d) the 
ICC’s use for challenging solely acts, and not omissions, of public 
powers; e) the right (now in most countries) of legal persons, like 
                                                                                                                       
Oct. 22, 1996) 1996, No. 422/96-vr, arts. 42-43, available at 
http://zakon.rada.gov.ua/cgi-
bin/laws/main.cgi?nreg=422%2F96%2D%E2%F0 (last visited January 2012). 
 70 This is the case, for example, in the Republic of Lithuania, whose 
Constitution, adopted in 1992, did not envisage a system of direct access to the 
Constitutional Court. However, the adoption of such a system has received 
serious consideration: see Vitalija Tamaviciute, Individual Constitutional 
Complaint: Lithuanian Perspective, Co.Co.A. (Comparing Constitutional 
Adjudication) (2008), available at: 
www.jus.unitn.it/cocoa/papers/PAPERS%203RD%20PDF/ICC%20Lithuania
%20edit%20ok.pdf (last visited January 2012). 
 71 See Venice Commission, supra note 7, at 4. 
 72 In Serbia, the ICC can be utilized without the previous exhaustion of all 
other legal remedies in those cases in which a plaintiff’s right to a trial within a 
reasonable time has been violated. 
 73 For example, Croatia (“legal person exercising public authority”); 
Montenegro (“legal person vested with public powers”); Serbia (“organizations 
exercising delegated public powers”); the FYRM. 
 74 Judicial decisions can be challenged in Czech Republic, Poland, Serbia, 
Slovak Republic, and Slovenia. 
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natural persons, to file an ICC with the Court75; f) the practice of 
allowing an ICC only for actions of public powers that have 
already occurred or legal enactments already in effect76; g) the 
declaration by the Constitutional Court that a constitutional right 
has been violated with declarations of unconstitutionality of the 
act or action at issue with erga omnes effects; h) the establishment 
(in some countries) of statutes of limitations for the exercise of the 
ICC77.  
 
 
G) Other ECHR Signatory States 
Because of the membership of the Republic of Turkey and 
the Russian Federation in the regional system of human-rights 
protection established by the Council of Europe, it is appropriate 
we also address briefly these two jurisdictions, in Part I of this 
study. 
With regard to the Republic of Turkey, a system of 
individual constitutional complaint was introduced in September 
2010 as the result of approval by referendum of a package of 
amendments to the 1982 Turkish Constitution78. The recourse has 
been designed so that individuals claiming that a public authority 
has infringed “rights within the scope of the ECHR which are 
guaranteed by the Constitution” can directly lodge an application 
                                                 
 75 Specifically: Armenia, Croatia, Czech Republic, Georgia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Montenegro, Serbia, Slovak Republic, and Ukraine. A few countries also allow 
collective action: E.g., the Slovak Republic (“bodies of the territorial self-
administration”).  
 76 Conversely, Georgia also allows challenge of an act which could infringe the 
fundamental rights of a person.  
 77 For example: FYRM (within two months from entry into force of the act); 
Montenegro (two months from act), Slovenia (two months from act); Poland 
(within three months from judicial decision); Croatia (one year from entry into 
force of the challenged act); and Albania (two years from act). 
 78 See Law No. 5982 of July 7, 2010, Resmi Gazete [R.G.] No. 27580 (May. 13, 
2010) (Turk.) [hereinafter Law No. 5982], available at 
http://rega.basbakanlik.gov.tr/Eskiler/2001/10/20011017M1.htm. Official 
English translation available at The Republic of Turkey Prime Ministry: 
Secretariat General for European Union Affairs, 
http://www.abgs.gov.tr/files/Bas%C4%B1nMusavirlik/haberler/constituiona
l_amendments.pdf (last visited January 2012). The referendum, which 
confirmed the package of amendments to the Constitution originally submitted 
to the Turkish Grand National Assembly on March 30, 2010, was held on 
September 12, 2010, adopted by the Assembly on May 7, 2010, and published in 
the Official Gazette on May 13, 2010. 
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with the Constitutional Court79; a recourse, therefore, seems 
limited only to those rights or freedoms guaranteed by the ECHR 
that are also enumerated in the Constitution. By establishing a 
domestic filter for cases of violations of fundamental rights before 
they are lodged with the Strasbourg Court, this requirement seems 
to respond to the Venice Commission’s previously noted concern 
of the overburdening of the ECtHR. The Constitution also 
mandates the exhaustion of all available legal remedies as a 
further admissibility requirement and expressly notes that in cases 
of individual constitutional complaints, judicial review “shall not 
be made for matters which would be taken into account during 
the process of recourse to legal remedies80.” 
With regard to the Russian Federation, a system of direct 
recourse to the Constitutional Court was first introduced in 1991, 
when the first Constitutional Court of Russia was created81. This 
Court, whose design drew inspiration from the systems of judicial 
review adopted in Austria, Germany and Italy, operated until 
1993 (when then-President Boris Yeltsin suspended its activity82) 
                                                 
 79 The revised text of article 148 prescribes in relevant part that: “Everyone 
may apply to the Constitutional Court on the grounds that one of the 
fundamental rights and freedoms within the scope of the European Convention 
on Human Rights which are guaranteed by the Constitution has been violated 
by public authorities. In order to make an application, ordinary legal remedies 
must be exhausted. In the individual application, judicial review shall not be 
made for matters which would be taken into account during the process of 
recourse to legal remedies. Procedures and principles concerning the individual 
application shall be laid down in law [then Law No. 5982].” 
 80 See Turk. Const. art. 148/1 (Turkey).  
 81 The Constitutional Court of Russia was established in 1991 with the Law 
“On the Constitutional Court of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist 
Republic.” Vedomosti S’yezda Narodnykh Deputatov i Verkhovnogo Soveta 
RSFSR [The Bulletin of the Congress of People’s Deputies and of the Supreme 
Soviet of the RSFSR], July 25, 1991, No. 30, Art. 1017. The Court initiated its 
activity at the end of October 1991. In December 1991, the former USSR was 
dissolved, leaving its constituents as independent states. For a thorough 
analysis of the history, structure and functions of the Russian Constitutional 
Court, see A. Trochev, Judging Russia: Constitutional Court in Russian politics 
1990-2006 (2008); J. Henderson, The Constitution of the Russian Federation: A 
Contextual Analysis (2011). 
 82 The suspension was announced after the opinion issued by the Court on 
September 21, 1993, which declared unconstitutional the act with which 
President Boris Yeltsin had dissolved the country’s legislature. Finding No. 2-Z 
of Sept. 21, 1993, (On Conformity of the Actions and Decisions of the Russian 
President with the Constitution), Vestnik Konstitutsionnogo Suda RF (Bulletin 
of the RF Constitutional Court) 1994, No. 6, p. 40.  
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under the 1978 Constitution of the Russian Soviet Federative 
Socialist Republics (“RSFSR”), as revised in December 199083. 
Under this first system of individual constitutional complaint, 
citizens claiming a violation of constitutionally protected rights 
could apply directly to the Constitutional Court and challenge 
every “application of law” by a public power, after the previous 
exhaustion of all available legal remedies. Citizens were therefore 
allowed to challenge not only statutory laws but also other 
normative acts and legislative omissions84. 
After the new Constitution for the Russian Federation had 
been adopted by national referendum on December 12, 1993, a 
new federal constitutional law on the Constitutional Court was 
enacted in 1994, and the Court eventually resumed its activity in 
February 1995. A new typology of direct access to the 
Constitutional Court – significantly different from the previous – 
was introduced85. According to the 1994 Federal Constitutional 
Law, the application can be lodged with the Court by natural 
persons (citizens as well as foreign nationals and stateless), 
groups, legal persons and associations for an alleged violation of 
constitutional rights. The violation must have been determined by 
legislation (only statutory law)86 applied or likely to be applied to 
a concrete case whose analysis before a judicial body has already 
been initiated87. This last admissibility requirement changes 
therefore the new direct constitutional complaint adopted in the 
                                                 
 83 See Law on the Improvement of the System of State Management, 1990. On 
the influence of the Austrian, German and Italian models of judicial review see 
H. Hausmaninger, From the Soviet Committee of Constitutional Supervision to the 
Russian Constitutional Court, 25 Cornell Int’l L.J. 305, 332 (1992).  
 84 A. Di Gregorio, La Corte costituzionale della Russia, in L. Mezzetti (ed.), Sistemi 
e Modelli di Giustizia Costituzionale 447 (2009). 
 85 Konstitutsiia Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Konst. RF] [Constitution] art. 125 (Russ.); 
Federal'nyi Konstitutsionnyi Zakon [FKZ] [Federal Constitutional Law], 
OKonstitutsionnyi Sud Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Konst. Sud RF] [On the 
Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation], Sobranie Zakonodatel'stva 
Rossiiskoi Federatsii [SZ RF] [Russian Federation Collection of Legislation] 
1994, No. 13, Item 1447, art. 3, 96-100. 
 86 It is no longer possible to challenge a legislative omission. 
 87 Federal'nyi Konstitutsionnyi Zakon [FKZ] [Federal Constitutional Law], 
OKonstitutsionnyi Sud Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Konst. Sud RF] [On the 
Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation], Sobranie Zakonodatel'stva 
Rossiiskoi Federatsii [SZ RF] [Russian Federation Collection of Legislation] 
1994, No. 13, Item 1447, art. 97.  
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Russian federation into a hybrid between an incidenter review 
system and a pure individual constitutional complaint88.  
Finally, without any claim to comprehensiveness but in 
order to complete the overview of signatory countries to the 
ECHR, it is worth mentioning that other relevant jurisdictions 
have adopted systems of individual constitutional complaint. 
These are: the Hellenic Republic (Greece)89, the Principality of 
Andorra90, the Principality of Liechtenstein91, the Republic of 
Cyprus92, and the Republic of San Marino93.  
 
 
H) A Common European Frame of Reference for the  
Individual Constitutional Complain 
From the overview presented in the previous paragraphs, it 
is possible to draw a few tentative conclusions. It is this author’s 
view that, considering the common, recurring features of the 
systems of individual constitutional complaint presented, it is 
possible to identify a common European frame of reference for 
direct access to constitutional judges, or, in other words, a 
                                                 
 88 See A. Di Gregorio, La Corte costituzionale della Russia, cit. at 84, 460-61. 
 89 1975 Syntagma [Syn.] [Constitution] art. 100. (Gr.) and art. 48 of Law no. 345 
establishes the Special Highest Court and states that “where conflicting 
judgments have been delivered by the Council of State, the Supreme Court or 
the Controllers Council as to the assessment of the constitutionality of a law or 
its interpretation, the Special Highest Court shall resolve the conflict at the 
request of: ... b. any person having a lawful interest.” 
 90 La Constitucio del Principat d’Andorra [Constitution] Apr. 28, 1993, arts. 
41.1, 102 (Andorra) and Llei Qualificada de la Justicia [Qualified Law on the 
Constitutional Court] Titles V-VI, art. 85-96 (Andorra), which describe the so-
called “empara” appeal, also called “appeal for constitutional protection.” 
Interestingly, the empara appeal is excluded for the rights protected in article 22 
of the Constitution: denial of residence permit renewal and expulsion of a 
lawful resident.  
 91 Constitution of the Principality of Liechtenstein Oct. 5, 1921, LR 101, art. 43, 
104); uber den Staatsgerichtshof (StGHG) [The Constitutional Court Act], 
Liechtensteinsches Landesgesetzblatt, Nr. 32, Jan. 20, 2004, arts. 15 & 20 (Liech.).  
 92 Cyprus, CMND. 1093 [Constitution] 1960, art. 146. Here the ICC can also be 
activated to challenge an omission of the public powers.  
 93 Declaration of Citizens’ Rights and of the Fundamental Principles of the San 
Marinese Legal Order, Albo del Pubblico Palazzo, no. 59, art. 16, July 8, 1974 
(allowing “a number of citizens entitled to vote representing a minimum of 
1.5% of the electorate” to lodge a direct question of constitutionality of “laws 
and normative acts” with the Collegio Garante in order to determine their 
compatibility with the fundamental principles expressed in the Declaration and 
in the laws referred to in the Declaration itself).  
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distinctive “European model of individual constitutional 
complaint”94. 
Generally, this model is characterized by the following 
features: i) the system of direct access to supreme and 
constitutional courts usually supplements the extant systems of 
incidenter review of constitutionality, which remains the main 
avenue to access the court vested with power of judicial review; ii) 
it requires the previous exhaustion of all available legal remedies 
before the complaint can be lodged; iii) it allows complaints to be 
filed against actions (and in some cases omissions) of public 
powers, including primary and secondary sources of law, 
administrative acts and, in some cases, judicial decisions; iv) 
foresees a statute of limitations for the filing of the complaint, 
which ranges from 30 days to 2 years since the enactment of the 
challenged act or decision; v) requires either the novelty or the 
fundamental constitutional significance of the question presented 
with the recourse, in addition to vi) a showing of personal, direct 
and actual interest in the recourse or an harm suffered from 
enactment of the act(s) or decision(s); vii) the applicants are 
usually natural and (less frequently) legal persons, residing on the 
territory of the State; viii) the complaint is allowed for both actions 
and omissions of public powers and ix) it usually protects a 
limited and well-identified number of first- and second-generation 
rights entrenched in the national constitution, usually leaving 
outside of its protection more modern, third-generation rights.  
As anticipated, the Italian Constitution does not currently 
envision the possibility for a private individual to apply directly to 
the Constitutional Court claiming infringement of fundamental 
constitutional rights. The question whether Italy should adopt a 
system of individual constitutional complaint and with what 
characteristics, can only be answered after careful consideration of 
the distinctive features of the Italian system of judicial review as 
designed by the Constituent Assembly in 1948 and its subsequent 
developments. 
 
                                                 
94 Our research shows that several other world jurisdictions have adopted 
systems of direct access to constitutional judges, among which it is possible to 
include, without claim of completeness: in Latin America, Costa Rica, El 
Salvador and Nicaragua; in Asia, Republic of Azerbaijan, the Republic of China 
(Taiwan), the Republic of India, the Republic of Indonesia, the Republic of 
Korea (South Korea), the Republic of Mongolia, and the Republic of the 
Philippines; in Africa, the Republic of South Africa. 
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II. Individual Constitutional Complaint and the Italian 
System of Judicial Review  
A) Overview of the Italian System of Judicial Review 
In the aftermath of the Second World War, Europe 
witnessed the establishment in some European States of so-called 
“centralized” systems of judicial review, which vested the power 
to review the constitutionality of norms or actions in a single 
specialized Court situated outside of the traditional structure of 
the judicial branch95. At the time when the Italian Constituent 
Assembly started working on the draft of a new constitution for 
the newly established Republic of Italy, two models of judicial 
review were widely known: the Austrian (or Kelsenian) 
centralized model and the United States decentralized one96. 
Members of the Constituent Assembly97 designed for Italy a 
model of judicial review that had no precedent at that time and 
that can be defined as a compromise between the centralized and 
the decentralized systems of judicial review. This special model 
made the Italian system of judicial review stand out among the 
Western systems of constitutional control. 
The 1948 Constitution of the Italian Republic provided for 
the establishment – for the first time in the Italian constitutional 
history – of a Constitutional Court (“Corte Costituzionale”)98.  The 
                                                 
 95 This is the so-called “second generation” of constitutional courts. According 
to this classification, “first generation” constitutional courts are those 
established in Europe in the 1920s and 1930s (Austria, Czechoslovakia, II 
Republic Spain). “Second generation” are the constitutional courts established 
in Italy and Germany in the mid-1940s while the “third generation” include 
constitutional courts established in countries that achieved full democracy only 
in the 1970s, like Greece, Spain and Portugal. Finally, the “fourth generation” 
would be represented by those established in former socialist countries in 
central and eastern Europe at the beginning of the 1990s: see J. Luther, R. 
Romboli & R. Tarchi, Giustizia Costituzionale in Spagna, cit. at. 49, vol. II, 290.  
 96 See H. Kelsen, Judicial Review of Legislation: A Comparative Study of the 
Austrian and the American Constitution, 4 J. Pol. 183, 185-86 (1942), explaining that 
Austria’s 1920 Constitution prohibited ordinary courts from reviewing the 
constitutionality of statutes; this task was left to a special Constitutional Court.  
 97 The Constituent Assembly was elected at the same time the constitutional 
referendum was held on June 2, 1946, in which Italian citizens chose a 
republican form of government for Italy over the previous monarchic regime 
under the House of Savoy. The constitutional referendum marked the first time 
in Italy that women were allowed to vote. The Assembly conducted its activities 
from June 25, 1946, until January 31, 1948.  
 98 For recent, English materials on the Italian Constitutional Court, see A. 
Pizzorusso, Italian and American Models of the Judiciary and of Judicial Review of 
Legislation: A Comparison of Recent Tendencies, 38 Am. J. Comp. L. 373 (1990); A. 
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idea of entrusting the constitutional control of legislation to an ad 
hoc body was indeed unknown to the previous Italian 
constitutional experience under the 1848 “flexible” Constitution: 
the Albertine Statute (“Statuto Albertino”)99. 
Italian legal scholars have identified three main reasons for 
the introduction of a system of constitutional justice in Italy in 
1948: a) the need to guarantee the “rigidity” of the new 
                                                                                                                       
Baldassarre, Structure and Organization of the Italian Constitutional Court, 40 St. 
Louis U. L.J. 649 (1996); P. Pasquino, Constitutional Adjudication and Democracy. 
Comparative Perspectives: USA, France, Italy, 11 Ratio Juris 38 (1998); W. J. 
Nardini, Passive Activism and the Limits of Judicial Self-Restraint: Lessons for 
America from the Italian Constitutional Court, 30 Seton Hall L. Rev. 1 (1999); M. L. 
Volcansek, Constitutional Politics in Italy: The Constitutional Court (2000); D. S. 
Dengler, The Italian Constitutional Court: Safeguard of the Constitution, 19 Dick. J. 
Int'l L. 363 (2001); T. Groppi, The Italian Constitutional Court: Towards a 
“Multilevel System”' of Constitutional Review? 23 J. Comp. L. 100 (2008); J. O. 
Frosini, Constitutional Justice, in G.F. Ferrari (ed.), Introduction to Italian Public 
Law 183 (2008); L.F. Del Duca, Introduction of Judicial Review in Italy - Transition 
from Decentralized to Centralized Review (1948-1956) - A Successful Transplant Case 
Study, 28 Penn St. Int'l L. Rev. 357 (2010); G.F. Ferrari & A. Gambaro, The Italian 
Constitutional Court and Comparative Law. A Premise, 1 Comp. L. Rev. 1 (2010), 
available at http://www.comparativelawreview.com (last visited January 
2012); E. Lamarque, Interpreting Statutes in Conformity with the Constitution: The 
Role of the Constitutional Court and Ordinary Judges, 2 IJPL 91 (2010), available at 
http://www.ijpl.eu (last visited January 2012). An overview of the most 
important decisions of the Italian Constitutional Court is available in French: see 
T. Groppi, Les grandes decisions de la Cour constitutionnelle italienne, in P. Bon & D. 
Maus (eds.), Les grandes decisions des Cours constitutionnelles europeennes (2008). 
An English translation of a selection of the most important decisions of the 
Italian Constitutional Court is available on the website of the Court at 
http://www.cortecostituzionale.it/ActionPagina_325.do (last visited January 
2012). Finally, in 1972, current Associate Justice of the United States Supreme 
Court Samuel Alito conducted a comprehensive study on the Italian 
Constitutional Court in order to draft his senior thesis at the Woodrow Wilson 
School of Public and International Affairs. The study is currently available for 
download from the website of the Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library of the 
University of Princeton: see S.A. Alito, An Introduction to the Italian Constitutional 
Court (May 31, 1972) (unpublished senior thesis, Woodrow Wilson School of 
Public and International Affairs), available at 
http://www.princeton.edu/[#x7E]mudd/news/Alito_thesis.pdf (last visited 
January 2012).  
 99 The Albertine Statute (Statuto Albertino) was the Constitution that King 
Vittorio Emanuele conceded to the Kingdom of Sardinia on March 4, 1848. In 
1861, the Statuto became the Constitution of the now unified Kingdom of Italy 
and remained in force until 1947. It is conventionally qualified as a “flexible 
constitution” since it did not require any special procedure – that is, different 
from the ordinary legislative procedure – nor any parliamentary supermajority 
to be amended.  
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Republican Constitution, protecting it against infringements in the 
form of statutory law inconsistent with the Constitution enacted 
by a transient political majority in the Parliament; b) the need to 
establish a “judge of freedoms” to whom the protection of the 
fundamental rights entrenched in the new Republican 
Constitution could be entrusted and c) the need to identify an 
institutional body that could adjudicate controversies between 
different organs of the State and between the State and the sub-
national units (the Regions) of the newly created regional State100. 
The Court is therefore a special body acting in a judicial 
manner for the safeguarding of the Constitution and the 
fundamental rights of the citizens against infringements 
originating from the legislative body in the form of 
unconstitutional statutory laws or acts with the force of law. It is 
the only institution vested with the power to decide questions 
regarding the constitutionality of laws101. 
Articles 134-137of the 1948 Constitution102  define the main 
features, structure and functions of the Court103. Although the 
Constitution became effective in 1948, the Constitutional Court 
was actually established only in 1956104, after the necessary 
                                                 
 100 See E. Cheli & F. Donati, Methods and Criteria of Judgment on the Question of 
Rights to Freedom in Italy, in D.M. Beatty (ed.), Human Rights and Judicial Review: 
A Comparative Perspective 227, 228-29 (1994).  
 101 See Art. 134 Costituzione (It.). Primary sources of law (statutes and acts 
with the force of law) are the only two types of sources of law that the 
Constitutional Court can review for constitutionality. Regulations and other 
secondary sources of law are excluded from its scrutiny.  
 102 The English text of the Italian Constitution is available on the website of the 
Italian Senate at 
http://www.senato.it/documenti/repository/istituzione/costituzione_inglese.
pdf (last visited January 2012).  
 103 The Corte Costituzionale is composed of fifteen judges, 1/3 appointed by the 
Parliament in joint session, 1/3 by the President of the Republic and 1/3 by the 
Supreme, ordinary, and administrative Courts (the Court of Cassation, the 
Council of State, and the Court of Accounts). See Art. 135 Cost. (It.). 
 104 The Constitutional Court was not established until 1956 due to political 
difficulties in selecting its judges. After the enactment of the Constitution and 
before the establishment of the Constitutional Court (i.e. between 1948 and 
1956), Italy experimented with a decentralized system of judicial review, where 
ordinary courts could refuse to apply those statutes they deemed 
unconstitutional. See Transitory and Final Provisions of the Constitution no. VII, 
supra note 102, for availability. The experience has been criticized, due to the 
resistance of the judges to implement the innovative provisions and principles 
of the new Constitution: see P. Calamandrei, La Costituzione e le leggi per attuarla. 
(Come si fa a disfare una Costituzione), in A. Battaglia et al. (eds.), Dieci anni dopo: 
GENTILI – A COMPARISON OF EUROPEAN SYSTEMS 
186 
 
implementing legislation was enacted – mainly through 
constitutional laws – in 1948 and 1953105. The adoption of a 
centralized – or Kelsenian – model of judicial review was 
tempered with some elements taken from the  decentralized 
model vesting every ordinary and administrative judge with the 
power to raise a question of the constitutional validity of the 
norms he or she had to apply in the case before him or her106. 
Therefore, while the system was, on one hand, marked by an 
“abstract” review of the constitutionality of the challenged 
statutory law or act with the force of law, on the other hand it was 
also “concrete” in the sense that it was triggered by a real 
controversy that had arisen before an ad hoc judge called to apply 
the challenged norm in the adjudication of a specific case. 
Besides those cases in which a claim of unconstitutionality 
can be lodged directly with the Constitutional Court by the 
Central Government or the Regions (so-called “principaliter” 
proceedings)107, questions of the constitutionality of legislation 
usually reach the Court through “incidenter” proceedings. 
Through these “incidenter” proceedings, claims can be brought 
before the Constitutional Court in two ways: issues arising in the 
course of civil, criminal, or administrative proceedings may come 
before the Court upon petition of either party or upon the ad hoc 
judge’s own initiative (so called “incidenter” review). If the ad hoc 
judge considers the issue of constitutionality “not manifestly 
                                                                                                                       
1945-1955: Saggi sulla vita democratica italiana (1955). See also J.H. Merryman & V. 
Vigoriti, When Courts Collide: Constitution and Cassation in Italy, 15 Am. J. Comp. 
L. 665 (1966-1967).  
 105 The laws that implemented art. 137 Cost. (It.) are Constitutional Law no. 
1/1948, enacted on February 9, 1948; Constitutional Law no. 1/1953, enacted on 
March 11, 1953; and Law no. 87/1953, enacted on March 11, 1953. Arts. 23-24 of 
the Law define procedures to access the Constitutional Court.  
 106 For an account of this discussion in the Constituent Assembly, see Italian 
Chamber of Deputies, 5 La Costituzione della Repubblica negli atti preparatori 
dell'Assemblea Costituente, 3657 (1970). For a recent comment on this debate, see 
R. Romboli, Riforma della giustizia costituzionale e ruolo della magistratura, 1 
Questione Giustizia 122 (1998).  
 107 The principaliter proceeding is regulated by article 127 of the Italian 
Constitution, last amended in 2001. Art. 127 Costituzione (It.). This proceeding 
can be used by the State to lodge a claim against a regional law and by the 
Regions to file a complaint against a state law. According to article 127 of the 
Constitution, both the State and the Regions have sixty days following 
publication of the regional or state law in the Official Gazette to file a claim with 
the Constitutional Court. Id. A Region may also take action against a law 
approved by another Region. See Frosini, supra note 98, at 198. 
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unfounded” (“giudizio di non manifesta infondatezza”) and the 
challenged statutory law “relevant” (“giudizio di rilevanza”) – that 
is, necessary in order to issue a decision – then the judge is bound 
to stay the trial and refer the matter with a “certification order” to 
the Constitutional Court, whose decisions, according to article 137 
of the Constitution, are final108. In order for the question of 
constitutionality to be admissible, the ad hoc judge is requested to 
indicate in the certification order – together with the relevance and 
plausibility of the question – the law challenged and the 
constitutional provisions allegedly violated by the law.  
With regard to the cases submitted by the ad hoc judge, the 
Constitutional Court does not decide on the merits of the dispute 
but, instead, only on the compatibility of the law with the 
Constitution. With regard to individuals, this is the only way to 
access the Constitutional Court. When an individual believes that 
one of his or her fundamental constitutional rights has been 
violated by a State or a Regional statutory law, the only way he or 
she can request the Constitutional Court to judge the 
constitutionality of the law is to file a case before an ordinary or 
administrative court and have the question of constitutionality 
raised before the Constitutional Court by the ad hoc judge. Only 
State and Regional Governments can directly refer issues of 
constitutionality to the Court, claiming that the area of reserved 
competences the Constitution assigns them has been encroached. 
The only exception to the rule that an individual generally 
lacks the power to challenge a law by lodging an application 
directly with the Constitutional Court can be found in the Special 
Statute for the Trentino-Alto Adige Region109. Indeed, Article 98 of 
the Special Statute110 allows the President of the Region or of one 
                                                 
 108 See Article 1 of Constitutional Law no. 1/1948 (It.) and Article 23 of Law no. 
87/1953 (It.).  
 109 Enacted with Constitutional Law no. 5/1948 (It.) of Feb. 26, 1948.  
 110 Art. 98 of the Special Statute for the Trentino-Alto Adige Region (1972), 
available at: www.gfbv.it/3dossier/diritto/statutoit.html#r14 (last visited 
January 2012), so provides:  
“1. Laws and acts having the force of law of the Republic can be contested by 
the President of the Region or of the Province following a resolution of the 
respective Parliament, for violation of the present Statute or of the principle of 
protection of the German and Ladin linguistic minorities.  
2. Should an Act by the State encroach upon the sphere of competence assigned 
by the present Statute to the Region or the Provinces, the Region or the 
respective Province may appeal to the Constitutional Court for a ruling in 
regard to the matter of competence. 
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of the two Provinces of Trento and Bolzano (following resolution 
of the Regional or Provincial legislative body) to directly raise an 
issue of constitutionality before the Constitutional Court, 
challenging a law or an act with the force of law adopted by the 
State and claiming a violation of the Trentino-Alto Adige Statute 
(which enjoys constitutional status) or the principle of protection 
of German and Ladin minorities. The special nature of the action, 
the  category of individuals authorized to raise an issue of 
constitutionality of the law, and the possibility to challenge the 
law – not only on grounds of encroachment of the competences, 
but also for protection of fundamental rights (protection of 
German and Ladin minorities) – are all elements underlining the 
difference between this mechanism and the incidenter control of 
constitutionality. It should be noted, however, that this narrow 
exception does not in any way diminish the validity of the general 
rule that an individual does not normally have the right to apply 
directly to the Court. 
 
 
B) Proposals of Introduction of a System of Individual 
Constitutional Complaint in Italy. The First Fifty Years: 
1947-1997 
When the Italian Constituent Assembly, back in 1947, was 
in the process of drafting the Constitution and deciding on the 
adoption of a centralized model of judicial review, it also 
considered the possibility of introducing a mechanism of 
individual constitutional complaint111. According to the text 
approved by the second section of the second subcommittee of the 
Constituent Assembly on January 24, 1947, every citizen could 
have challenged a law – within one year from the law’s enactment 
– before the Constitutional Court on grounds of 
unconstitutionality112. The text of the provision, intended to be 
                                                                                                                       
3. The appeal shall be lodged by the President of the Region or that of the 
Province, following a resolution by the respective Government.” 
 111 For an account of the projects addressing the introduction of the ICC and 
presented during the work of the Constituent Assembly, see C. Mezzanotte, Il 
giudizio sulle leggi. Le Ideologie del Costituente, Vol. 1  (1979); T. Groppi, Il ricorso di 
amparo in Spagna, cit. at 34, 4340; G. Volpe, L'accesso alla giustizia costituzionale: le 
origini di un modello, in R. Romboli (ed.), L'accesso alla giustizia costituzionale: 
caratteri, limiti, prospettive di un modello 3 (2006).  
 112 The approved text stated: “Everyone, within the term of one year [from the 
enactment] can challenge a law before the Constitutional Court on ground of its 
unconstitutionality. A rejected application of unconstitutionality will be banned 
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incorporated into the Second Part of the Constitution, was drafted 
at that stage in a broad fashion, without any further information 
on the acts that could have been challenged (the text refers 
generically to “laws,” without further explaining if the term 
includes both State and Regional laws and also acts with the force 
of law), or on the circumstances allowing recourse (no reference 
was made to the infringement of fundamental rights, but only to 
the alleged unconstitutionality of a law). Any reference to the ICC, 
however, was eventually excluded by the Editorial Committee of 
the Constituent Assembly from the text of the draft Constitution 
submitted to the Constituent Assembly for approval113.  
On December 2, 1947, reference to the ICC was made again 
in two proposed amendments to the draft Constitution, both 
presented during the debate before the Constituent Assembly. The 
text of the proposed amendments was more carefully drafted, and 
some additional elements were introduced with regard to the 
circumstances granting access to the Constitutional Court114. 
Indeed, Giuseppe Codacci Pisanelli, one of the members of the 
Constituent Assembly, presented a first amendment to the text 
under scrutiny, which vested the power to raise a question of 
constitutionality before the Constitutional Court with “every 
citizen who could demonstrate to have an interest [in raising the 
question] due to a harm inflicted to his constitutionally 
guaranteed rights or interests115.” 
                                                                                                                       
from being lodged again.” The transcript of the proceedings of the second 
section of the second subcommittee are available at 
http://www.nascitacostituzione.it/05appendici/06p2/06p2t6/03/01/index.ht
m?001.htm&2 (last visited January 2012). The original Italian: “Chiunque, entro 
il termine di un anno, può impugnare una legge avanti la Corte per 
incostituzionalità. Una domanda di incostituzionalità respinta non può essere 
più riproposta.” Available at 
http://www.nascitacostituzione.it/05appendici/06p2/06p2t6/03/01/index.ht
m?001.htm&2 at the bottom (last visited January 2012). See also F. Rigano, 
Costituzione e Potere Giudiziario: Ricerca sulla formazione delle norme costituzionali 
240 (1982); R. Romboli, Il giudizio costituzionale incidentale come processo senza 
parti 17 (1985); C. Mezzanotte, Il giudizio sulle leggi, cit. at 111; L. Carlassare, I 
diritti davanti alla Corte costituzionale: ricorso individuale o rilettura dell'art. 27 L. n. 
87/1953?, in Diritto e Società 443 (1997).  
 113 See La Costituzione della Repubblica negli atti preparatori dell'Assemblea 
Costituente, cit. at 106. 
 114 Id.  
 115 The original Italian text of the amendment stated: “L'annullamento di una 
legge ordinaria invalida da parte della Corte costituzionale avrà efficacia 
oggettiva e potrà, inoltre, essere promosso in via principale dal Governo, da 
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The second proposed amendment was introduced, on that 
same day, by Costantino Mortati, recommending that “a recourse 
for constitutional illegitimacy c[ould] be lodged directly with the 
Constitutional Court within the term of prescription established 
by law, by those subjects who claim a direct harm to a right or to a 
legitimate interest deriving from a statutory provision... .116” 
The Constituent Assembly eventually decided to leave the 
determination of the “conditions, forms and terms for proposing 
judgments on constitutional legitimacy117” to a subsequent 
constitutional law, without excluding the possibility of 
introducing the ICC. Openness to reception of the ICC is also 
evident in the fact that the Editorial Committee of the Constituent 
Assembly, in addition to the text submitted to and finally adopted 
by the Assembly, drafted a tentative text of Article 137 of the 
Constitution including a provision introducing the ICC, in case the 
Assembly had decided to vote on its establishment118. 
When the implementing law was enacted in 1948, no 
reference was made to the ICC, which therefore remained 
excluded from the circumstances granting access to the Court. 
                                                                                                                       
cinquanta deputati, da un Consiglio regionale, da non meno di diecimila 
elettori, o da qualsiasi cittadino che dimostri di avervi interesse per la lesione di un suo 
diritto o interesse costituzionalmente garantito” (emphasis added).  
 116 In original: “Il ricorso per illegittimità costituzionale può essere prodotto 
direttamente innanzi alla Corte costituzionale nel termine che sarà fissato dalla 
legge, da chi pretenda direttamente leso dalla norma un suo diritto o interesse 
legittimo... .” Reference to the ICC was also made on December 3, 1947, by 
Francesco Dominedò in the debate over the proposed text of Article 137 of the 
Constitution. Remarks of Francesco Dominedò, Deb. (Dec. 3, 1947). 
 117 Art. 137 Costituzione [Cost.] (It.). 
 118 In regards to the part of the article addressing the ICC, it stated that, “the 
citizen or the body which claims a direct and current harm to a right or to a 
legitimate interest can lodge directly with the Court an issue of 
constitutionality.” The full Italian text of Article 137 of the Constitution, in the 
version including the ICC, stated: “La questione di legittimità costituzionale, 
che nel corso d'un giudizio sia rilevata d'ufficio o sollevata da una delle parti e 
non ritenute dal giudice manifestamente infondata, è rimessa alla Corte 
costituzionale per la sua decisione. Il cittadino o l'ente che ritenga leso in modo 
diretto ed attuale un suo diritto o interesse legittimo può promuovere 
direttamente il giudizio di legittimità costituzionale davanti alla Corte. Tale 
giudizio può essere altresì promosso, nell’interesse generale, dal Governo o da 
un quinto dei componenti d'una Camera o da tre Consigli regionali.” See 
Meuccio Ruini, President, Committee for the Constitution, Statement Regarding 
Article 137 of the Constitution (Dec. 22, 1947).  
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According to some commentators119, had the ICC been 
introduced in 1947-1948, allowing an individual to challenge 
decisions issued by courts, the jurisprudence of the highest 
ordinary and administrative courts would have been influenced 
by the values and principles embodied in the new Italian 
Constitution and made consistent with them in a more timely 
manner. 
Since 1947-1948, in Italy, proposals for introduction of a 
system of individual constitutional complaint have recurred120. 
Generally, there have been two main reasons weighing in support 
of its adoption: first, the need to develop a more comprehensive 
system for the protection of fundamental rights; second, the need 
to correct some of the shortcomings that have supposedly arisen 
in the application of the incidenter control of constitutionality121. 
Before the establishment of the Constitutional Court in 1956, a 
proposal for the introduction of a system of individual 
constitutional complaint was first presented by Mauro 
Cappelletti122. Another proposal in support of the introduction of 
a system of individual constitutional complaint was later 
presented by several Italian constitutional-law scholars in a 
roundtable held in Florence on December 9-10, 1965123. That same 
                                                 
 119 See E. Crivelli, La tutela dei diritti fondamentali e l'accesso alla giustizia 
costituzionale 12 (2003). The author explicitly cites the Post-Franco Spain and 
Germany in the aftermath of the Second World War, where – in the author’s 
perspective – the individual constitutional complaint helped making citizens 
more readily aware of the new rights entrenched in the Constitution and of the 
occurred transition to a whole new constitutional system. Id. 
 120 See also A. Scavone, Appunti sulle proposte di introduzione del ricorso 
costituzionale diretto in Italia, in Rivista trimestrale di diritto e procedura civile 
1241 (1981). C. Mezzanotte, Il problema della fungibilità tra eccezione di 
incostituzionalità e ricorso diretto alla Corte costituzionale, in Giustizia e 
Costituzione 77 (1997). 
 121 Id. 
 122 M. Cappelletti, La giurisdizione costituzionale delle libertà (1955). 
 123 It was on this occasion that Italian constitutional scholars underlined for 
the first time the existence of so-called “grey areas” (i.e., normative acts not 
challengeable for constitutionality before the Court) in the protection provided 
by the Constitutional Court against unconstitutional acts of the State. See G. 
Maranini (ed.), La giustizia costituzionale (1966) (proceedings of the roundtable 
with Italian constitutional scholars). See also P. Carrozza, R. Romboli & E. Rossi, 
I limiti all'accesso al giudizio sulle leggi e le prospettive per il loro superamento, in R. 
Romboli (ed.), L'accesso alla giustizia Costituzionale: caratteri, limiti, prospettive di 
un modello 679 (2006); see also A. Sandulli, Rapporti tra giustizia comune e giustizia 
costituzionale in Italia (1968). Participants in the roundtable drafted a 
constitutional amendment for the introduction of a system granting direct 
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year, a draft constitutional amendment was introduced into the 
Parliament on December 15124. Despite arousing the interest and 
partial support of constitutional scholars and practitioners, these 
proposals were not further pursued and, as a result, were 
eventually abandoned. 
Scholars have long since recognized that the incidenter 
control of constitutionality represents an adequate means to 
protect the fundamental rights of the citizens. Moreover, the 
Constitutional Court, in the past twenty years, has increasingly 
interpreted the rules regulating the procedure before the Court 
and the provisions of the Constitution in light of the Court’s 
purpose to broaden protection of fundamental rights. The Court 
itself and constitutional-law scholars, however, have come to 
realize that in some circumstances the protection provided 
through this mechanism may not be complete. This recognition 
has led some citizens, in several circumstances, to set up so-called 
lites fictae (i.e., fictitious cases) before an ordinary court in order to 
have access to the Constitutional Court and have their rights 
protected from an unconstitutional law125. Indeed, the 
introduction of the ICC in the Italian legal system has always been 
intended to supplement – rather than substitute for – the extant 
system of incidenter control of constitutionality, in order to 
address its shortcomings. 
Subsequent initiatives aimed at introducing an individual 
constitutional complaint are worth mentioning126. In 1989, a 
proposal for an amendment to the Italian Constitution was 
introduced into the Parliament127. The proposed amendment 
                                                                                                                       
access to the Constitutional Court not to mere individuals but, conversely, to a 
certain number of citizens (so-called “popular action”): “all citizens, within one 
year from the entry into force of a law or an act with the force of law, can 
challenge it directly before the Constitutional Court”: U. Spagnoli, I problemi 
della Corte. Appunti di giustizia costituzionale 104 (1996).  
 124 Draft Constitutional law no. 2870, introduced into the Italian Chamber of 
Deputy on December 15, 1965. The constitutional law, if approved, would have 
allowed direct recourse to the Constitutional Court against decisions of the 
highest ordinary and administrative Courts (Court of Cassation and Council of 
State) in case of incorrect application of constitutional provisions.  
 125 See, generally, E. Crivelli, La tutela dei diritti fondamentali, cit. at 119.  
 126 The following projects have been presented before the establishment of the 
Bicameral Commission for Constitutional Reforms in the XIII Legislature whose 
role and functions will be detailed further infra. 
 127 See Records of the Italian Parliament (Atti Parlamentari), Chamber of 
Deputies, n. 4168, Aug. 3, 1989, signatories Andò, Cappiello, et al.  
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would have introduced the possibility for a citizen to apply 
directly to the Constitutional Court to challenge statutes, acts with 
the force of law, judicial decisions, and acts issued by the public 
administration whenever a fundamental right guaranteed by the 
Constitution had been violated. The same year, a seminar was also 
organized at the Constitutional Court to address the possibility of 
adopting a system of individual constitutional complaint128. 
During the XII Legislature of the Italian Parliament (April 
1994-May 1996), a Studying Committee for the Institutional, 
Electoral and Constitutional Reforms was set up by then-President 
of the Council of Ministers, Silvio Berlusconi129. The Committee 
drafted a project aimed at increasing the competences of the 
Constitutional Court, including the possibility of judging on 
“recourses presented by anyone claiming to have been harmed by 
an act of the public authority in one of the inviolable rights 
recognized and guaranteed by the Constitution130.”  
  
The text of the proposed amendment went on, stating: 
 
“Recourses are admissible only after exhaustion of all 
remedies of the ordinary and administrative jurisdictions. 
However, the Constitutional Court can nonetheless judge upon 
those constitutional recourses already lodged and deemed to be of 
an important and general interest or when serious, immediate and 
irreparable harm can be suffered by the applicant due to the time 
required to receive protection from ordinary and administrative 
courts131.” 
 
 Despite initial consideration, none of these attempts 
proved, in the end, successful. 
 
                                                 
 128 The seminar was held on November 13-14, 1989. The proceedings have 
been published in AA.VV., Giudizio “a quo” e promuovimento del processo 
costituzionale (1990).  
 129 The Studying Committee was established by President of the Council of 
Ministers Decree of July 14, 1994. 
 130 The final report of the Committee, presented on December 21, 1994, was 
published by the Department for Constitutional Reform under the Presidency 
of the Council of Ministers in 1995. An account of the Committee’s aims and of 
the content of its final report can be found at 
http://www.camera.it/parlam/bicam/rifcost/dossier/prec08.htm (last visited 
January 2012).  
 131 Id. 
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C). 1997: The Parliamentary Commission for 
Constitutional Reforms and the Revision of the Italian 
Constitution 
In 1997, a new Congress on the subject was organized in 
Ferrara, on the occasion of the celebration for the 200 years since 
the establishment of the first Constitutional Law chair in Europe at 
the University of Ferrara132. Also in 1997, the newly established 
Parliamentary Commission for Constitutional Reform 
(“Commissione Parlamentare per le Riforme Costituzionali”) 
preliminarily approved the project for a comprehensive reform of 
the Italian Constitution drafted within the XIII Legislature of the 
Italian Parliament (May 9, 1996 - May 29, 2001)133. This project 
deserves a more detailed consideration. 
The Commission, also referred to as “Bicameral 
Commission,” was composed of thirty-five members of the 
Chamber of Deputies and thirty-five members of the Senate, 
appointed by the Presidents of the two Houses of Parliament. The 
Bicameral Commission started its activity in February 1997 with 
the purpose of drafting a comprehensive reform of the Second 
Part of the Italian Constitution. 
Even though the project drafted by the Commission was 
eventually rejected by the Parliament and never came into effect, it 
nonetheless represents, to date, the most comprehensive attempt 
to revise the Second Part of the Italian Constitution, attempting to 
introduce – among other institutions – a system of individual 
constitutional complaint in the Italian legal system. The projected 
revision of the Constitution, in the part addressing the 
                                                 
 132 L. Carlassare (ed.), Il diritto costituzionale a duecento anni dalla prima cattedra 
in Europa (1998). The first chair in Constitutional Law in Europe was indeed 
established at the University of Ferrara in 1797. The Congress was held on May 
2-3, 1997); see also V. Onida, La Corte e i diritti: tutela dei diritti fondamentali e 
accesso alla giustizia costituzionale, in A. Pace (ed.), Studi in Onore di Leopoldo Elia, 
Tomo II (1999). During the Congress, then-Constitutional Court Judge Valerio 
Onida expressed the opinion that the introduction of a system of direct access to 
the Court for appeal of judicial decisions violating fundamental constitutional 
rights would have been desirable. The majority of the other participants, 
however, expressed a more cautious stance on the advisability of introducing 
such a system, especially for fear of developing a conflicting relationship 
between the Constitutional Court and ordinary judges.  
 133 Legge Costituzionale 24 gennaio 1997, n. 1 (It.) (The Bicameral Commission 
was established with Constitutional Law no. 1/1997 titled “Establishment of a 
Parliamentary Commission for Constitutional Reforms”), available at 
http://www.camera.it/parlam/bicam/rifcost/legist/legge.htm (last visited 
January 2012).  
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Constitutional Court, aimed at increasing its competences and 
functions, introducing new circumstances providing for the 
possibility of lodging an application with the Constitutional 
Court134. Among those new competences, the text of Article 134 
would have been amended in order to include, under letter g), the 
power to judge on “recourses lodged with the Court in order to 
protect, against all public powers, the fundamental rights 
guaranteed by the Constitution, according to the conditions, forms 
and statutes of limitations established through [a subsequent] 
constitutional law.”135 
The Report on the System of Guarantees136, drafted within 
the Commission by Marco Boato, explicitly identifies the reasons 
for introduction of the individual constitutional complaint in the 
purpose of supplementing the protection of fundamental rights 
already provided through the incidenter system of judicial review, 
in order to provide protection to those cases falling outside of the 
Court’s existing competences. The Report also shows that the 
members of the Commission were aware of the application that 
this mechanism had found in several foreign jurisdiction137, as 
                                                 
 134 The project would have modified articles 59, 134, and 137 of the 
Constitution of the Italian Republic.  
 135 The final draft of the proposed new art. 134, approved by the Bicameral 
Commission, in relevant part, read as follows: “The Constitutional Court shall 
pass judgments on: … 
 - (g) Recourses lodged with the Court in order to protect, against all public 
powers, the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution, according to 
the conditions, forms and statutes of limitations established through [a 
subsequent] constitutional law.”  (Original Italian wording of letter g): “sui 
ricorsi per la tutela, nei confronti dei pubblici poteri, dei diritti fondamentali 
garantiti dalla Costituzione, secondo condizioni, forme e termini di 
proponibilità stabiliti con legge costituzionale.” Commissione parlamentare per 
le riforme costituzionali, Progetto di legge costituzionale (1997), available at 
http://www.camera.it/parlam/bicam/rifcost/docapp/rel7.htm (last visited 
January 2012).  
 136 Commissione parlamentare per le riforme costituzionali, Relazione sul 
sistema delle garanzie del deputato Marco Boato (Parliamentary Committee on 
Constitutional Reform, Report on the system of guarantees by Member Marco 
Boato) (2008), available at 
http://www.camera.it/parlam/bicam/rifcost/docapp/rel6.htm (last visited 
October 2011). 
 137 Id. In the Report, express reference was made to the Spanish recurso de 
amparo, the German Verfassungsbeschwerde, and the Austrian 
Individualbeschwerde or Individualantrag. All three models were considered; 
specifically highlighted were the differences between these three models with 
regard to the acts reviewable for constitutionality.  
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well as the increased workload for foreign constitutional courts 
deriving from its adoption. Despite this significant disadvantage, 
however, the ICC system was deemed worth introducing. In the 
Commission’s view, the complaint should have been designed as 
an exceptional means for protection of fundamental rights and 
should have avoided compromising the Court’s functionality. This 
latter purpose would have been achieved through the 
establishment of clear admissibility requirements. On the other 
hand, the purpose of the Commission was to achieve a protection 
as broad as possible for the fundamental rights entrenched in the 
Constitution138, making them protectable by the Constitutional 
Court even in the absence of a controversy. The Report was 
eventually sent to the Parliament together with the final draft of 
the proposed amendment. 
 Throughout the drafting process, constitutional-law 
scholars provided advice and comments on the different options 
available and on the choices made by the Commission. When the 
Commission approved the project, and the final text was ready to 
be introduced into the Parliament for a final vote, criticism was 
expressed over several of the choices that had been made139. 
Criticism focused, on one hand, on the fact that, while the 
project had acknowledged the residual character of the individual 
constitutional complaint in the protection of fundamental rights, it 
eventually established quite broad admissibility criteria. Indeed, 
according to the proposed new text of Article 134 Const., the 
complaint could have been proposed against any act issued by a 
public power, including judicial decisions. Moreover, in the final 
                                                 
 138 Generally recognized as those listed in Articles 1-11 of the Italian 
Constitution. However, the category of “fundamental rights” is far from being 
unanimously recognized in its content and has been variously defined by the 
doctrine. See, e.g., A. Pace, Diritti fondamentali al di là della Costituzione, in Politica 
del Diritto 3 (1993). Some scholars have sustained a perfect coincidence between 
the category of “fundamental right” and those listed in the Constitution; but see 
A. Baldassare, Diritti Inviolabili, in 11 Enciclopedia Giuridica 18 (1989). Some 
others have stated that the two categories should be kept separated, the 
category of “fundamental rights” being, on one hand, narrower than that of the 
rights entrenched in the Italian Constitution, and at the same time, on the other 
hand, wider, including some rights which are only implicitly addressed by the 
Constitution. For a detailed account of these theories, see A. Spadaro, Il problema 
del “fondamento” dei diritti “fondamentali”, in I Diritti Fondamentali Oggi 64 
(1995).  
 139 See L. Paladin, Corte costituzionale: aumentano le funzioni ma il futuro potrebbe 
portare la paralisi, in Guida al Diritto 43, 65 (1997). See also M. Carducci, Ipotesi di 
accesso diretto alla Corte costituzionale, in 2 Quaderni Cost. 315 (1998). 
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draft, the requirement of previous exhaustion of judicial remedies, 
present in earlier drafts, was eventually omitted. The Report itself 
underlines how the final draft of the proposed amendment 
significantly differed from the first. This first draft was clear in 
providing access to the Court only when a subject could not resort 
to any other jurisdictional remedy140. The Committee first 
rephrased the final part of the article, requiring the previous 
exhaustion of judicial remedies, and then, eventually, omitted any 
such reference altogether141. 
On the other hand, further criticism focused over the 
legitimacy and opportunity to leave to a subsequent constitutional 
law the identification of the fundamental rights whose 
infringement could be claimed by an individual. The explanatory 
Report suggested that the Constitutional Court be given some 
leeway in determining the category of “fundamental rights” at 
issue. 
Finally, the new provision referenced neither the acts that 
could be challenged nor the criteria to be applied by the Court in 
selecting applications. The indeterminacy of the provision led 
some commentators to state that the project, far from leaving to a 
subsequent constitutional law the mere implementation of an 
already defined mechanism, left to that law the definition of the 
very core features of the constitutional complaint142.  
As previously noted, the project was not adopted by the 
Parliament and was eventually abandoned143. 
Additional structured proposals for the introduction of a 
system of individual constitutional complaint have not been 
advanced since 1997, but the issue was raised again in 1999 during 
                                                 
 140 The first draft stated: “The Constitutional Court shall pass judgment: ... g) 
On complaints lodged by anyone claiming a harm to one of the fundamental 
rights guaranteed by the Constitution inflicted by an act of a Public Power, in 
case no other judicial remedy is provided.” The original text, in Italian, 
provided: “g) ricorsi presentati da chiunque ritenga di essere stato leso in uno 
dei diritti fondamentali garantiti dalla Costituzione da un atto dei pubblici 
poteri avverso il quale non sia dato rimedio giurisdizionale.” 
 141 See Relazione Sul Sistema Delle Garanzie del Deputato Marco Boato, 
www.camera.it/parlam/bicam/rifcost/docapp/rel6.htm (last visited January 
2012) (It.).  
 142 See e.g., S. Panizza, Il ricorso diretto dei singoli, in A. Anzon, P. Caretti & S. 
Grassi (eds.), Prospettive di accesso alla giustizia costituzionale (Atti del Convegno di 
Firenze del 28-29 maggio 1999) 81 (2000).  
 143 See Riforme, la fine della Bicamerale, Corriere della Sera, June 3, 1998.  
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a Conference organized in Florence144 and has been addressed 
periodically by various Presidents of the Italian Constitutional 
Court in their annual press conferences145. 
 
 
D). Incidenter Review: An Already Effective System? 
Recurrently over the past forty years, several constitutional-
law scholars have expressed the view that a more comprehensive 
and efficient protection of fundamental rights in Italy could be 
achieved with the introduction of a system of individual 
constitutional complaint in one of its various forms, to supplement 
and enhance the protection of fundamental rights already in 
existence146. The recurring interest in the establishment of this type 
of recourse to the Constitutional Court can be explained with the 
desire of legal scholars and practitioners to achieve protection for 
those legal situations and areas of law that are not already covered 
by the incidenter control of constitutionality147. It is worth asking, 
however, if – and to what degree – introduction of an individual 
constitutional complaint into the system would be really useful in 
overcoming some of the supposed shortcomings and the so-called 
“grey areas” of the Italian system of judicial review. 
                                                 
 144 A. Anzon, P. Caretti & S. Grassi (eds.), Prospettive di accesso alla giustizia 
costituzionale (Atti del Convegno di Firenze del 28-29 maggio 1999) 81 (2000). The 
Congress was organized by the so-called “Gruppo di Pisa” and held in Florence 
on May 28-29, 1999.  
 145 See La giustizia costituzionale nel 1997, in Foro italiano, Feb. 11, 1998, 133: 
transcript of the annual press conference of the President of the Constitutional 
Court, Judge Renato Granata. See also Annual press conference of the President 
of the Constitutional Court, Judge Valerio Onida, Jan. 20, 2005, available at 
www.cortecostituzionale.it (last visited January 2012). See also P. Passaglia, 
Sull'inopportunita di introdurre il ricorso diretto individuale: qualche riflessione (ed 
una provocazione), available at 
http://joomla.ddp.unipi.it/documenti/persdoc/contributi/Ricorso_diretto_in
dividuale.pdf (last visited January 2012), offering reflections on the 
(in)opportunity to adopt a system of ICC in Italy after consideration and 
comparison of the statements of the two Presidents.  
 146 See M. Cappelletti, La giurisdizione costituzionale delle libertà, cit. at 122. See 
also V. Onida, La Corte e i diritti, cit. at 132. See also A. Anzon, Per una piu ampia 
garanzia dei diritti costituzionali dinanzi alla Corte: il ricorso individuale diretto, in V. 
Angiolini (ed.), Libertà e giurisprudenza costituzionale (1992); R. Caponi, «Ciò che 
non fa la legge, lo fa il giudice, se capace»: l’impatto costituzionale della giurisprudenza 
della Corte di cassazione italiana, in AA.VV., Annuario di Diritto Comparato e di 
Studi Legislativi (2011).  
 147 See generally, R. Balduzzi & P. Costanzo (eds.), Le zone d’ombra della giustizia 
costituzionale. I giudizi sulle leggi (2007).  
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Often included amongst these shortcomings is the 
impossibility for the Italian Constitutional Court to judge the 
constitutionality of secondary sources (e.g. regulations), 
administrative acts and judicial decisions, and the supposed 
untimely protection that the “incidenter” review would grant 
when law-decrees or election laws would be involved148. 
However, it is this author’s opinion that the introduction of a 
system of direct individual access offers uncertain advantages and 
some clear risks. The protection of fundamental rights should, 
therefore, preferably be addressed by ordinary courts, and a 
system of individual constitutional complaint – if introduced – 
should be designed in order to become a merely residual recourse 
providing citizens an additional avenue to access the Court for 
protection of “rights or interests” from an unconstitutional 
encroachment originating from public powers. 
Consistent with this approach, the Italian Constitutional 
Court, through its jurisprudence, has tried to develop all the 
potentialities of the incidenter system of judicial review to provide 
a broad and comprehensive protection of fundamental rights. One 
of the mechanisms the Court has used to enhance rights protection 
has been a progressive interpretation of the rules regulating third-
party participation to the hearings before the Constitutional Court, 
thus overruling its own previous strict interpretation, which had 
categorically excluded any third-party intervention149. This 
broader interpretation has prompted a shift from a so called 
“objective interest” in the judicial review of the constitutionality of 
legislation (i.e. a general interest of the whole legal system in the 
constitutionality of legislation), to a more “subjective” one (i.e. a 
specific interest in the protection of the subjective fundamental 
rights at stake in the decision of constitutionality). According to 
some authors, with this shift, the Court has increasingly become 
“a rights Court150.” 
Moreover, the Court has also used its power to decide on 
the “relevant” and “not manifestly unfounded” character of the 
question of constitutionality raised by the ad hoc judge, in order to 
move toward a “more decentralized system” of judicial review of 
                                                 
 148 See E. Crivelli, La tutela dei diritti fondamentali, cit. at 119, 18.  
 149 See Corte cost., decisions no. 20/1982, no. 421/1991, nos. 314 and 315/1992 
and no. 176/1996.  
 150 V. Onida, & M. D'Amico, Il giudizio di costituzionalità delle leggi, Materiali di 
diritto costituzionale. Il giudizio in via incidentale, Vol. I, 247 (1997).  
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legislation151. Indeed, the Constitutional Court has repeatedly 
urged ordinary judges to directly further an “adapting 
interpretation” (“interpretazione adeguatrice”), that is, to directly 
address an issue of constitutionality of legislation without raising 
a question before the Constitutional Court when – among the 
many possible scenarios – a constitutionally oriented 
interpretation of the applicable law is available152. While this 
practice brings with it the risk that ordinary judges will avoid 
referring questions of constitutional legitimacy to the 
Constitutional Court, even in cases when this would be necessary, 
it also has the advantage of determining a more concrete (i.e. 
closer to the facts of the case) and more tailored analysis of the 
constitutionality of legislation which eventually results in a 
decision with only inter partes effect. Conversely, decisions of the 
Constitutional Court that declare the unconstitutionality of a 
statute have erga omnes effect. The protection of fundamental 
rights in this case is therefore also enhanced. 
The “incidenter” system of judicial review also leaves 
certain types of laws outside the protection provided by the 
Constitutional Court. The system is deemed to be inadequate, for 
example, to evaluate the constitutional legitimacy of laws whose 
alleged unconstitutionality should be ascertained timely and 
without delay153. Until recently, this was the case, for example, of 
those acts with the force of law adopted by the Government 
according to the procedure established by Article 77 of the Italian 
Constitution (decrees-law)154. According to the original stance of 
the Constitutional Court, the constitutionality of these acts with 
specific regard to the existence of the requirements of urgency and 
necessity for their adoption could no longer be assessed after they 
had been converted into law by the Parliament (conversion must 
                                                 
 151 See M. Cappelletti, Questioni nuove (e vecchie) sulla giustizia costituzionale, in 
Giurisprudenza Costituzionale 857 (1990).  
 152 See generally Corte cost. decisions nos. 347/1998, 349/1998, 418/1998, 
450/1998, 283/1999 and 436/1999. 
 153 See E. Crivelli, La tutela dei diritti fondamentali, cit. at 119, 47.  
 154 See Republic of Italy Cost. art. 77, which states that, in relevant part: “When 
in extraordinary cases of necessity and urgency the Government adopts under 
its own responsibility provisional measures having the force of law, it must on 
the same day present them for conversion into law to the Houses that, even if 
dissolved, shall be especially summoned and shall be assembled within five 
days. The decrees lose effect from their inception if they are not converted into 
law within sixty days from their publication”. 
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take place within sixty days of enactment)155. Only in 1995 did the 
Court, realizing the gap that its own jurisprudence had created, 
overrule its previous decisions and affirmed its competence to 
judge the constitutionality of already converted decrees-law 
(together with the converting Law) with regard to the necessity 
and urgency requirements that justified the measure156. 
Other problems are usually deemed to arise with regard to 
those statutory laws – fundamental for the functioning of the 
whole democratic system – whose first application could take 
place well before a question of constitutionality could be referred 
to and resolved by the Constitutional Court, for example, election 
laws157. 
With regard to the category of acts that the Court can 
scrutinize for consistency with the Constitution, article 134 Const., 
as interpreted by the Constitutional Court, precludes the Court 
from considering the constitutionality of secondary sources, such 
as regulations158. The Court has consistently stated that it is 
allowed to review the constitutionality of only primary sources of 
law, that is, statutory laws and acts with the force of law (namely, 
decrees-law and legislative decrees). Secondary sources, however, 
and more specifically regulations, in many cases represent the 
only source of law regulating a whole area of human activities as a 
consequence of recurring efforts of delegification159, and cannot, 
                                                 
 155 See generally Corte cost. Decision no. 108/1986. 
 156 The Constitutional Court overruled its previous jurisprudence to affirm its 
competence to judge on already converter decrees-law in decision no. 29/1995. 
For an account of the development of the Court’s jurisprudence on the 
constitutionality of decrees-law, see R. Romboli, Decreto-legge e giurisprudenza 
della Corte costituzionale, in A. Simoncini (ed.), L’emergenza infinita. La decretazione 
d’urgenza in Italia 107 (2006).  
 157 See E. Crivelli, La tutela dei diritti fondamentali, cit. at 119, 47. With regard to 
election laws, the author recalls how, back in 1956, Piero Calamandrei had 
already highlighted the possible shortcoming of the incidenter system of 
judicial review, especially with regard to election laws infringing upon the 
principle of equal suffrage or that modify, in violation of the Constitution, the 
age for franchise and eligibility: see P. Calamandrei, Corte costituzionale e autorità 
giudiziaria, in Rivista di diritto processuale 16 (1956).  
 158 See Corte Cost. no. 23/1989 and no. 456/1994.  
 159 Through processes of “delegification” the Parliament authorizes 
administrative authorities to adopt regulations in areas previously governed by 
statutory law, for efficiency purposes. For a treatment of this phenomenon, in 
connection with access to the Constitutional Court, see T. Giovannetti, 
Delegificazione, regolamenti e atti amministrativi, in R. Romboli, L'accesso alla 
giustizia costituzionale 467 (2006).  
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therefore, be scrutinized either by the Constitutional Court or by 
ordinary judges for consistency with a law or with an act having 
the force of law, since these latter are missing. In all those cases, 
introduction of the possibility for an individual to apply directly 
to the Constitutional Court would provide protection to rights 
otherwise left without guarantees. 
 
 
III. Final Remarks on the Advisability to Adopt the  
Individual Constitutional Complaint in Italy 
The examples provided by several of the European 
countries analyzed in the Part I of the article show that a system of 
individual constitutional complaint can be introduced in a 
constitution even at a subsequent stage in the development of the 
constitutional system.  
In this respect, while adoption of a broad system of 
individual constitutional complaint in new democracies may 
enhance legitimacy and acceptance of a newly established 
constitutional or supreme court in the system, and offer the 
opportunity to subject to constitutional scrutiny legislation 
enacted during the previous – often undemocratic – regime, it is 
our view that different considerations should apply with regard to 
those constitutional systems and systems of judicial review – as 
the Italian – that have already achieved full legitimacy, acceptance 
and support and that have also developed a considerable line of 
decisions. In this latter case, only a truly compelling need to 
address important “grey areas” in the protections of fundamental 
rights should mandate adoption of a system of direct access to the 
Constitutional Court. The debate on the introduction of the 
individual constitutional complaint in Italy is, therefore, deeply 
linked to the achieved effectiveness of the already existing system 
of incidenter and concrete judicial review of legislation chosen by 
the Constituent Assembly and as further developed by the 
Constitutional Court over the past years of activity. 
In Italy, the impossibility of directly resorting to the 
Constitutional Court for protection of constitutional rights has led, 
over time, to the enhancement of the incidenter review of 
legislation as a way to protect fundamental rights and to the 
development of this type of review in original ways. Ordinary 
judges are seen as the “door keepers”160 of the Court, in a 
                                                 
 160 The expression was originally created by Piero Calamandrei. 
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“bottom-up” process activated through the incidenter review. The 
role that the Italian Constitutional Court has played in the system 
has relied on and has been directly proportional to the sensitivity 
of ordinary judges with regard to issues like the protection of 
fundamental rights and the implementation of the principles 
entrenched in the Constitution. Indeed, as we have seen, it is up to 
ordinary and administrative judges to decide when – and if – to 
raise an issue of constitutionality of a law before the 
Constitutional Court when some prerequisites (“non manifesta 
infondatezza” e “rilevanza”) are present. 
The Constitutional Court, in the past years, however, 
through its case law, has reversed this process, making it a “top-
down” one. The Court has recognized that all judges have an 
important role, not only in applying its decisions, but also, and 
more importantly, in directly conducting a limited control of the 
constitutionality of statutory laws (including those affecting 
fundamental rights), with the only limit represented by the 
impossibility for ordinary judges to refuse to apply directly (i.e. 
without first resorting to the Constitutional Court) those laws they 
considered unconstitutional (a role that is still reserved exclusively 
to the Constitutional Court)161. 
Increasingly often, the Constitutional Court has declared 
inadmissible the questions of constitutional legitimacy presented 
and has asked the ad hoc judges to directly provide a 
“constitutionally oriented” interpretation of the challenged 
statutory law162. Before referring a question to the Constitutional 
Court, an ordinary judge is now expected to look for an 
interpretation of the statute at issue that would preserve its 
constitutional validity163 and show – together with the two 
                                                 
 161 It is worth remembering, though, that ordinary judges can already decide 
to not apply – in Italy as in all the other Member States of the European Union – 
national statutory laws which they deem are inconsistent with European Union 
law, probably furthering the general level of decentralization of the system.  
 162 See, e.g., Corte Cost. no. 356/1990: “in principle, laws are not declared 
unconstitutional when it is theoretically possible to interpret them in 
unconstitutional ways, but when it is impossible to interpret them in a way 
which is consistent with the Constitution.” See also Corte Cost. nos. 347/1998, 
349/1998, 418/1998, 450/1998, 283/1999 and 436/1999. 
 163 While in Spain this is explicitly required by art. 5.3 of the Ley Organica del 
Poder Judicial (1985), the Constitutional Court of Italy developed this 
requirement through case law: see Corte Cost. no. 356/1990. See T. Groppi, The 
Italian Constitutional Court: Towards a ‘Multilevel System’ of Constitutional Review? 
2 J. Comp. L. 100, 116 (2008).  
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abovementioned requirements – that a constitutionally adequate 
interpretation is impossible164. As a consequence of this evolution, 
the protection of constitutional rights against unconstitutional 
legislation is enhanced and can be addressed directly before 
ordinary judges. 
This “virtuous connection” between the Constitutional 
Court and ordinary courts has contributed to dispel the original 
distrust towards ordinary judges that characterized the early years 
following the enactment of the 1948 Constitution and that 
represented the main reason for the adoption of a centralized 
system of judicial review165. It is this author’s view that the 
introduction of a system of direct constitutional recourse, 
especially in cases in which a decision issued by ordinary or 
administrative judges could be challenged before the 
Constitutional Court, would run the risk of breaking this 
“virtuous connection,” implicitly accusing ordinary judges of 
providing an ineffective protection of rights. This is the reason 
why, while some Italian scholars support the introduction of a 
broad ICC system166, others – whose opinion we share – look 
favorably at the introduction of a constitutional complaint on 
condition that judicial decisions cannot be challenged167. 
                                                 
 164 T. Groppi, Corte costituzionale e principio di effettività, 1 Rassegna 
Parlamentare 189, 213 (2004). See, e.g., Corte Cost. no. 343/2006: “the ad hoc 
judge ... has the duty to choose, among the several possible interpretations of a 
provision, the one which can dispel doubts of constitutional illegitimacy, 
raising an issue of constitutionality only when the text of the provision 
precludes any possibility to interpret it in a constitutionally-oriented way.” 
 165 See E. Lamarque, Interpreting Statutes in Conformity with the Constitution: The 
Role of the Constitutional Court and Ordinary Judges, 1 It. J. Pub. L. 91, 105 (2010), 
quoting P. Calamandrei, Corte Costituzionale e autorità giudiziaria, 1 Rivista di 
diritto processuale 8, 9 & 53 (1956) (discussing the importance of an “active 
collaboration” between the Constitutional Court and ordinary judges “working 
together like two complementary and inseparable gears of a single procedural 
mechanism” for the correct functioning of constitutional review in Italy), 
available at 
http://www.ijpl.eu/assets/files/pdf/2010_volume_1/IJPL%20volume%201_2
010.pdf (last visited January 2012). 
 166 See A. Anzon, Per una più ampia garanzia dei diritti costituzionali, cit. at 146, 
24; R. Caponi, «Ciò che non fa la legge, lo fa il giudice, se capace», cit. at 146. In fact, 
this is actually the case in Czech Republic, Germany, Poland, Serbia, Slovak 
Republic, Slovenia, Spain and Switzerland where judicial decisions are among 
the acts that may be challenged through direct recourse. 
 167 See R. Romboli, Ampliamento dell'accesso alla Corte costituzionale e introduzione 
di un ricorso diretto a tutela dei diritti fondamentali, in A. Anzon, P. Caretti & S. 
Grassi (eds.), Prospettive di accesso alla giustizia costituzionale (Atti del Convegno di 
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On a different note, it is our opinion that the advisability (or 
lack thereof) of the introduction of the ICC in Italy should also – 
and more properly – be assessed in light of the possibility for an 
individual to receive supranational protection of rights by 
applying to the European Court of Human Rights for violation of 
the rights entrenched in the Convention168; or the possibility – 
since 2007 – to directly claim infringement of rights protected by 
the European Convention on Human Rights before Italian 
ordinary and administrative judges. Indeed, with regard to this 
latter development, the Constitutional Court, in four pivotal 
decisions169, in light of the amended text of article 117 of the 
Constitution170, has recognized infra-constitutional (but supra-
legislative) status to the ECHR, defining it as “intermediate law” 
                                                                                                                       
Firenze del 28-29 maggio 1999) 81 (2000); R. Romboli, “Torniamo alla Costituente”: 
considerazioni in ordine all'introduzione di un ricorso diretto del singolo e delle 
minoranze parlamentari alla Corte costituzionale, in 43 RIPE - Revista do Instituto 
de Pesquisas e Estudos 31 (2008).  
 168 According to the individual application procedure set up in article 34 of the 
Convention. On this topic, see M. Cappelletti, Questioni nuove (e vecchie) sulla 
giustizia costituzionale, cit. at 151, 32, where the author expresses the view that, 
in light of Italy’s participation in the system of the European Convention of 
Human Rights, the introduction of a national individual constitutional 
complaint would be, under many aspects, redundant. See also E. Crivelli, La 
tutela dei diritti fondamentali, cit. at 119, 150. 
 169 See Corte cost. decisions nos. 348 and 349/2007; Corte cost. decisions nos. 
311 and 317/2009 (decisions are available, in English, on the website of the 
Italian Constitutional Court: 
http://www.cortecostituzionale.it/ActionPagina_325.do (last visited January 
2012). See also Corte Cost. decision no. 80/2011, confirming the status of the 
ECHR as “intermediate law” (“norma interposta”) after the entry into force of the 
Lisbon Treaty. On the first four pivotal decisions, see G. Gentili, The status of the 
ECHR in the Italian hierarchy of sources as determined by the Italian Constitutional 
Court (Constitutional Court decisions ns. 348, 349/2007), in Palomar, available at 
http://www.unisi.it/dipec/palomar/italy001_2008.html#3 (last visited 
January 2012); G. Gentili, The Italian Constitutional Court and the legal status of the 
European Convention on Human Rights in the national legal system: positive 
competition between fundamental rights provisions (Constitutional Court decisions 
ns. 311, 317/2009), PALOMAR, available at 
http://www.unisi.it/dipec/palomar/italy009_2010.html#5 (last visited 
January 2012).  
 170 Art. 117, cl. 1 Costituzione [Cost.] (It.), indicating that “Legislative powers 
shall be vested in the State and the Regions in compliance with the Constitution 
and with the constraints deriving from EU legislation and international 
obligations” (emphasis provided), with the ECHR being considered by the 
Court in decisions 348 and 349/2007 as falling within the latter type of 
constraints. 
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(norma interposta)171.” As a consequence of this achieved status, the 
Convention is now directly applicable in the Italian legal system 
and is now part of the Constitutional Court’s parameter for 
constitutional review of domestic legislation172. 
It is beyond doubt that the direct individual access has the 
capacity to highly affect the system of judicial review adopted in a 
country, especially considering its primary side-effects: a 
significant increase in the docket of a constitutional court, most 
likely affecting its ability to provide timely justice for claims 
falling within the Court’s jurisdiction (as happened in Spain 
before the 2007 reform); as well as a possible delegitimation of 
ordinary judges, especially when the individual constitutional 
complaint system allows applications against decisions of 
ordinary and administrative courts. 
The Italian system of judicial review has shown, over the 
years, the ability to re-define itself to address “grey areas” in 
fundamental-rights protection through a progressive 
interpretation of the existing rules on the incidenter procedure to 
access the Constitutional Court. If a system of individual 
constitutional complaint needs to be adopted, this system also 
needs to be carefully designed, in order to structure the direct 
recourse in a way that would not affect the existing “virtuous 
connection” between the Constitutional Court and ordinary 
judges, and would not increase the Court’s workload to the point 
of making its decisions untimely and – ultimately – ineffective. 
Also, in light of the very recent development regarding the infra-
constitutional status now accorded to the European Convention 
on Human Rights in the Italian system of sources of law, it is our 
view that adoption of a general and broad system of ICC would 
ultimately bring about more disadvantages than advantages. A 
more narrowly designed system, introducing only very specific 
                                                 
 171 Meaning that the Convention now has supremacy over legislative materials 
but remains subordinate to the Constitution in the Italian hierarchy of sources 
of law 
 172 However, as highlighted by Philipp Cede: “the ECHR’s status does not 
reach the same level as [EU] law: As opposed to norms of [EU] law – which 
automatically prevail over contrary domestic legislation in such a way that any 
court must leave the conflicting domestic norm disapplied, conflicts between 
ECHR law and domestic legislation may not be resolved by ordinary Courts 
directly but must be referred to the Corte Costituzionale,” P. Cede, Report on 
Austria and Germany, in G. Martinico & O. pollicino (eds.), The National Judicial 
Treatment of the ECHR and EU Laws 55 (2010) (comparing the approaches 
followed by the Constitutional Courts in Austria and Germany). 
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and not-generalized cases of direct recourse and granting access to 
“enumerated and well-defined individuals or state bodies ... 
and/or for enumerated and well-identified violations” – as 
emphasized by the Constitutional Court itself in one of its 
decisions173 – seems to be more compatible with the current 
development of the Italian structure of judicial review.  
This system – in our view – should borrow from some of 
the features of what we have previously defined as the “European 
model of individual constitutional complaint,” bearing in mind, at 
the same time, that fundamental rights could and should be 
protected – first and foremost – by ordinary judges and only 
afterward by the Constitutional Court (mandating therefore the 
previous exhaustion of all other available legal remedies), and 
exclusively in cases in which the applicant could demonstrate the 
novelty of the constitutional question (i.e. that the issue has not 
already been addressed by the Constitutional Court) and a 
personal, direct, and current interest in the annulment of the 
act(s). The determination on the existence of these two 
prerequisites should be rather strict and, in any case, be left to the 
Constitutional Court itself (or to a special panel within the Court 
specifically created to conduct this review, on the German 
example), in order to allow the Court to exercise a significant 
control over its own docket and workload.  
On the other hand, for the sake of legal certainty and to 
safeguard both the principle of separation of powers and the 
independence of the judiciary, the identification of the rights 
protected through direct recourse should be left to the legislator 
rather than to the Constitutional Court, and the complaint should 
be allowed only in cases of actions (not omissions) by the public 
powers in the form of legislation and regulations, but in this latter 
case only in those areas not regulated by primary sources of 
law174. Consistent with the same rationale (legal certainty) and in 
                                                 
 173 The issue was indeed addressed by the Constitutional Court in an obiter 
dicta in decision no. 406 of July 14, 1989, par. 3 of the “Conclusions on points of 
law.” According to the Court, “grey areas” can be addressed by “modifying 
(through constitutional amendment) the system of judicial review with the 
introduction of new principaliter proceedings (actionable by enumerated and 
well-defined individuals or state bodies ... and/or for enumerated and well-
identified violations).” See Corte cost. decision no. 406/1989 
 174 The decision on the admissibility in these cases still falling – as anticipated 
– within the exclusive purview of the Constitutional Court.  
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order to further equality of treatment, a clear statute of limitation 
should also be established.175  
To balance out these rather strict accessibility requirements, 
the possibility to file a recourse should be granted to both legal 
and natural persons, and, in this latter case, to both citizens and 
foreign nationals residing in Italy, with few formal 
requirements176.  
Structured as a “weaker,” or “narrower” form of individual 
constitutional complaint (as opposed to the “stronger” or 
“broader” form, adopted in most eastern European countries and 
in pre-2007 Spain), the individual constitutional complaint could 
supplement the already existing and fully-developed Italian 
incidenter system of judicial review without altering the balance 
between ordinary judges and the Constitutional Court achieved 
through years of exercise of judicial review. Furthermore, it would 
also provide effective protection for the “grey areas” currently not 
covered by the incidenter review, without overburdening the 
Court.  
It is indeed our view that, in designing a system of direct 
individual access to the Italian Constitutional Court, drafters 
should be guided by a leading Italian legal scholar’s observation 
that a system of judicial review operating more broadly but less 
timely (due to the overburdening of the Court) would be less 
beneficial than one operating promptly but on a narrower scale177. 
 
                                                 
 175 In our view, the statute of limitation for filing of the complaint should not 
exceed one year (as in Germany and Croatia) nor be shorter than two months 
(as in FYRM, Montenegro, Slovenia) since the enactment of the challenged 
act(s). The two-year time period adopted in Albania seems indeed too extensive 
while, conversely, Switzerland’s 30-day time-frame appears rather short. Spain 
and Belgium have adopted, respectively, a three-months and a six-months 
statutes of limitation.  
 176 But with the possibility, for the Constitutional Court, to issue fines for those 
individual complaints which are filed and clearly lack one or more basic 
requirements, in analogy with the system adopted in Germany. 
 177 See M. Cappelletti, Intervento, in G. Maranini (ed.), La giustizia costituzionale 
399-400 (1966).  
